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Special report of the Secretary-General on the strategic assessment of the United Nations presence in Libya

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted following my report of 5 September 2014 (S/2014/653), in which I informed the Security Council of my request that the United Nations Secretariat conduct a review of the United Nations presence in Libya, in close partnership with the Libyan authorities and in consultation with regional and international partners. The present report covers the main findings of that exercise, as well as recommendations for the reconfiguration of the United Nations presence in Libya to adjust to the new realities on the ground.

2. In preparing the present report, the Department of Political Affairs, in coordination with the inter-agency task force for Libya, initiated a strategic assessment of the United Nations presence in Libya. The assessment focused on the current and anticipated challenges faced by the United Nations in the consolidation of peace. A strategic assessment mission, comprising representatives from the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Field Support, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Development Programme and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (representing the agencies, funds and programmes), visited Tunisia from 7 to 13 January 2015. In developing recommendations, consideration was given to the priorities of key Libyan parties, as well as the concerns of regional and international partners.

II. Context and factors of instability

3. Since early July 2014, Libya has witnessed the most serious outbreak of armed conflict since the 2011 revolution. The fighting in Tripoli, Benghazi and elsewhere in the country has been characterized by serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. Indiscriminate firing of heavy weaponry by all sides in densely populated areas has resulted in significant civilian casualties. The internationally recognized authorities are no longer in Tripoli and parallel legislative and executive bodies have been put in place. The political division and the fighting have led to an upsurge in internal displacement and tangible worsening in the provision of and access to essential services. Imports of commodities and movements across the country have been severely curtailed. Women have been

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particularly affected by the escalation of the conflict, and those visibly engaging in public affairs have been increasingly targeted. It has also gravely affected the lives of cultural groups (namely, the Tabu, Tuareg and Amazigh communities), as well as refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants, which is already a vulnerable population.

4. At the heart of the current political impasse and rapidly deteriorating security situation is a stark deficiency in the area of political and human rights resulting from decades-old policies of systematic disenfranchisement of the population and the undermining of State institutions, which effectively created a culture characterized by lack of accountability, absence of transparency and denial of civil rights and liberties. Libyans have therefore experienced difficulty in forging a national consensus or a shared vision regarding how to address the Qadhafi legacy and manage the transition, which has had serious consequences for the nascent political process.

5. This is compounded by the fact that emerging political, societal and security actors in Libya remain heavily fragmented. There are divisions not only between former regime opponents, including those who participated in the revolution and those who had held positions with the regime, but also along ideological, regional, local, tribal and ethnic lines. Many of these categories overlap, and the distinctions commonly used to define the various political camps have little explanatory value as concerns political positioning and behaviour. As a result, security and political actors have become embroiled in battles aimed at safeguarding factional and other particular interests.

6. The political transition of Libya was predicated on the assumption that popularly elected institutions, namely the legislative and executive branches, would take the lead in putting in place the necessary foundations for a modern democratic State. These institutions were also intended to take forward crucial reforms to allow for effective national security decision-making, the reform of State security institutions, including those responsible for governance, building the capacity of the courts, the judiciary, the prison service and prosecution, and establishing transitional justice mechanisms. However, effective decision-making structures have not been put in place and the responsibilities of each branch of government were not properly clarified in the constitutional declaration. As a result, relations between the transitional legislature and the executive branch have been marked by strong competition and rivalry, preventing them from designing and implementing the required policies to ensure a successful transition process. In addition, the poor quality of services provided to the population, particularly in the fields of security, health and education, has undermined public trust in the State.

7. Furthermore, the successive Governments of Libya have not been able to establish control over the use of force. Libyan security forces remain weak and lack proper command and control, cohesion and morale, while armed groups have proliferated. The sanctioning of the armed brigades by the State in 2012, including by giving them law enforcement and custodial functions, and the comparatively high salaries paid to their members resulted in the establishment of security structures parallel to those of the State. Arms control, disarmament and the integration of revolutionary fighters into State structures, or their reintegration into civilian life, remain key to national efforts and international assistance to reform the security sector.

8. Many armed groups have increased their capabilities and armaments, becoming more powerful than the national army and police forces, while remaining on the payroll of the Government. The vast amounts of arms and ammunition stockpiled around the country under the Qadhafi regime remained, for the most part, intact or partially destroyed and unstable, unsecured and easily accessible to armed groups and radical elements. Large quantities of arms were also imported by legal and illegal means, providing a steady supply of heavy weaponry and ammunition. While efforts have been made to tighten the arms embargo, the flow of weapons into the country continues. The gradual erosion of the public's trust in its elected institutions has provided space for these armed groups to broaden their scope of influence, with many operating with impunity.

9. Little progress has been achieved in confronting the legacy of crimes committed by the former regime. Thousands remain in custody without trial, missing persons issues have been addressed only partially and in a discriminatory manner, and little attention has been given to the claims of victims of the former regime. A fact-finding and reconciliation commission has been established by law but is not yet operational. While some of the officials of the Qadhafi regime are now being prosecuted, there are increasing concerns about the fairness of such proceedings and no measures have been taken against those allegedly responsible for human rights violations committed after the revolution. Political activists, human rights defenders and media professionals of both genders have increasingly been threatened and killed. Attacks on courthouses and the judiciary, as well as the recent fighting, have halted the work of the judiciary in Benghazi, Derna, Sirte and Tripoli.

10. The absence of an effective justice system amid the ongoing power struggle has been accompanied by a breakdown of law and order. Both ordinary and politically motivated crimes have been on the rise since 2013. In Tripoli and Benghazi especially, the number of kidnappings, carjackings, improvised explosive device attacks and robberies has increased significantly, undermining the population's safety and security. Benghazi has been plagued by a wave of assassinations of former regime officials and members of the judiciary, as well as armed and security forces and activists.

11. Meanwhile, the southern cities of Sabha, Kufra and Awbari have seen large-scale clashes along tribal and ethnic lines, with many killed and the State unable to contain the violence or pursue those responsible without relying on armed groups. Moreover, porous borders have enabled continued smuggling and provide easy passage for criminal elements into and out of the country. Vast unpopulated areas of the relatively less developed and poorer southern parts of the country allow these criminal and extremist groups to continue their activities outside the reach of the State.

12. The economy of Libya remains heavily dependent on oil revenues and no significant progress towards diversification has been made. Oil revenues make up 90 per cent of the annual budget, which has led control of the fields, pipelines and ports to become a goal of the fighting in itself, and their blockage a tool for political leverage. In addition, the lack of a transparent revenue collection and distribution process not only provides ample opportunities for graft and corruption but also exacerbates subregional and local conflicts.

13. There have been significant delays in the development of the new constitution, which has not only impeded the effective functioning of the nascent institutional

framework but has also prolonged and possibly exacerbated the power struggle among the political actors. While the Constitution Drafting Assembly has been careful not to be drawn into the ongoing political struggle, the situation may become untenable once the body begins its work on controversial issues, such as the role of Islam in the new State, resource distribution, federalism and rights of cultural groups.

14. While the lack of a United Nations presence inside Libya and limited access due to insecurity limit the availability of verified information, it is estimated that 360,000 people have been internally displaced as the result of recent fighting. Most of them live with relatives or host communities or in public buildings, but the lack of cash and skyrocketing prices for food and non-food items may decrease their ability to support themselves. Frequent fuel shortages and electricity cuts are impacting people's livelihoods. Owing to ongoing fighting, the Government's lack of access to resources and the location of warehouses in conflict zones, the supply chain for food and medical supplies has been broken. Furthermore, with the departure of foreign doctors and nurses, many hospitals have stopped functioning. There is very low capacity to deal with the increasing number of trauma-related cases inside Libya, and emergency medical services have collapsed in some areas. After humanitarian activities were largely phased out in 2012, most key donors, Libyan partners and United Nations agencies now anticipate that humanitarian needs will increase in the course of 2015, even under the most positive scenario of a successful political dialogue. Meanwhile, there is a strong feeling of neglect and abandonment in the east and south of the country, in particular in terms of assistance.

III. Priority areas for Libya

15. Drawing from the analysis of the conflict and possible scenarios for the next 12 to 18 months, as well as the priorities expressed by national actors, four priorities have been identified for Libya for the next two years to resume its democratic transition and set the basis for long-term stability.

1. Ending the conflict

16. An initial agreement on addressing the immediate crisis will be needed. This requires the main parties to reach agreements on ceasefire, security and interim political arrangements. In addition to reducing the impact of the fighting on the population, ending the conflict would pave the way for the restoration of security and the resumption of the transitional process. It would also reduce the obstacles to the delivery of essential services and to freedom of movement for the population. In that context, stopping abuses of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law should be a priority.

2. Completing the transitional process

17. For the process to move forward, an agreement must be reached on a political framework that lays the foundations for a stable Libya based on legitimate and inclusive institutions and respect for the rule of law, including arrangements for the remainder of the transition. This will need to be underpinned by the adoption of a constitution and a clear road map to address issues related to the proliferation of arms and of armed groups operating outside State authority, as well as the implementation of an effective process of transitional justice.

3. Maintaining or restoring essential services

18. At a time when Libya is undergoing considerable stress, it is important, including for the success of the political process, that essential services to the population be maintained or restored throughout the country.

4. Moving towards a stable and democratic State

19. The longer-term stability of Libya will depend upon visible progress towards the establishment of legitimate, inclusive and effective institutions based on the rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights. This includes a public financing and budget system that is transparent and accountable. Independent media and active civil society are essential to achieving these goals.

20. The first three priorities would bring Libya back to a state of relative normalcy, in which the democratic transition continues and people are able to live their lives without fear of abduction, assassination or being caught in combat zones, and with some access to essential services. The fourth priority will require immediate, robust and sustained engagement by the international community to support the realization of the aspirations of the people of Libya to live in a functioning State with representative institutions.

21. The success of the transition will require consultative, inclusive and transparent processes in compliance with the obligations of Libya under international law. Throughout, special attention will need to be paid to the rights and particular needs of women and vulnerable groups, such as internally displaced persons, cultural groups, persons with disabilities, children, refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants, including through the development of legislation and mechanisms to ensure compliance by Libya with its obligations under international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law.

IV. United Nations strategic priorities in Libya

22. The establishment of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) in 2011 signalled the strategic investment by the United Nations in the transformation of Libya into a viable, stable and democratic State. Despite recent setbacks in attaining that goal, the Organization continues to enjoy the strong support of Libyan stakeholders and the international community to lead and coordinate international efforts in support of Libya. However, the circumstances under which UNSMIL was created have changed. The resumption of fighting and the political divisions have prevented the United Nations from implementing some critical mandated tasks aimed at building the capacity of national institutions.

23. While the above analysis shows the broad array of challenges faced by Libya, the current situation requires the United Nations to focus its efforts. Based on the priorities for Libya identified above, as well as on an analysis of the United Nations capacity and comparative advantages, the priorities set out below are recommended for United Nations engagement in Libya.

1. Support to the political process

24. The immediate priority of the United Nations is to support Libyans in reaching a political agreement on the way forward for the transition, thereby bringing an end

to the semblance of parallel State institutions, and reaching an agreement on basic security arrangements in the major towns and cities, including a ceasefire.

25. Reaching these agreements, however, will not end the demand for facilitation and mediation by the United Nations. An agreement that ends the fighting, political crisis and institutional division would create the conditions for the next step, which is a broad political framework and national vision. This would take place within the context of a long-term, formal, multi-pronged dialogue process facilitated by the United Nations that engages political parties, civil society, tribal forces, municipalities and armed groups with the objective of reaching a broad consensus that bolsters support for a political agreement and provides a more conducive environment for the pursuit of national reconciliation. It is therefore expected that facilitation by the United Nations of dialogue at various levels will not decrease once the political process resumes. The United Nations will have to continue to provide good offices to ensure that the agreements are implemented and that the transition is as smooth as possible to prevent the resumption of conflict.

26. In order to provide mediation and good offices, the United Nations will need to maintain expertise on a variety of issues, including in the areas of political affairs, mediation processes, human rights, transitional justice, gender issues, arms and ammunition management, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform, rule of law, and support to key State institutions and governance. The United Nations will need to be in a position to provide strategic advice, including to support the negotiation, implementation and monitoring of any ceasefire and to assist with realistic and practical arrangements for interim security. It will be necessary to maintain constant engagement with Libyan security forces and armed groups to reduce the effect of fighting on the civilian population and to encourage behaviour by all armed parties that is in accordance with international norms, including the transfer of custodial and law enforcement functions to central authorities. Such engagement with formal and informal security structures will also be an important part of the broader political dialogue, as interaction with the armed groups will be key to obtaining ceasefires and negotiating interim security arrangements utilizing the trust that has been built up over a period of time.

2. Protection

27. Regardless of the evolution of the political situation, the United Nations will continue to give high priority to human rights monitoring, reporting and advocacy, given the scale of ongoing violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, the need for impartial and accurate reporting in a heightened context of politically motivated claims and counter-claims, and the demands for justice and accountability originating from within Libyan society.

28. Given the presence of large caches of arms and ammunition, as well as explosive remnants of war, which have a serious impact on the security of the population and its freedom of movement, the United Nations should also continue its task of securing weapons, combating improvised explosive devices attacks and clearing explosive remnants of war in close coordination with, and in support of, the Libyan Mine Action Centre and security institutions as they become established.

3. Support to key institutions

29. Competition among institutions makes the identification of Libyan interlocutors for the United Nations contentious. Divided institutions are weak and have a limited absorptive capacity; however, the few remaining functioning and neutral institutions have to be supported, as their success or failure will have a considerable impact on the future of the country. For these reasons, the United Nations should continue to provide support to the Constitution Drafting Assembly, the High National Electoral Commission and the National Council on Civil Liberties and Human Rights. The United Nations should also be ready to support a Government of national unity once it is established.

30. Given the need to protect the wealth and financial assets of Libya in order to safeguard the social, economic and political aspirations of the Libyan people, the United Nations should work with international partners to ensure support to the Central Bank. The international community has a responsibility to support Libya in using and distributing its resources through the Central Bank and public finance mechanisms during the transition phase in a transparent, effective and inclusive manner that benefits the population as a whole.

4. Support for the provision of essential services

31. The United Nations should support the restoration of such essential services as health and education on an emergency basis and help maintain the access of vulnerable groups to food, electricity, water and sanitation, as well as justice. Support to ensure the restoration of law and order will also be required. This will imply working with national institutions, but also, and perhaps primarily at the local level, with municipalities and other local groups.

32. In so doing, the United Nations will need to factor in the potential for a rapid increase in humanitarian needs and the serious deterioration in the provision of essential services across the country. These risks will be especially acute if the political crisis deepens or the country faces an extended negotiation process and the conflict causes further destruction of critical civilian infrastructure.

5. Coordination

33. Given the broad support it enjoys from Libyan interlocutors, as well as international and local partners, the United Nations remains uniquely placed to coordinate international engagement on Libya. This involves coordination at the political level, including through the various international special envoys to Libya and others involved in Libyan affairs, as well as at the strategic and operational levels. However, the effectiveness of the United Nations coordination role will depend not only on the Organization but also on the willingness of its partners to participate in coordination arrangements and to contribute resources.

34. Coordination will also be necessary for the continuation of humanitarian assistance. The provision of such assistance should remain a priority for the United Nations system in Libya. Principled, needs-based assistance must be expanded to meet the growing needs of the population. The United Nations and Libya's partners must also stand ready to intervene rapidly after the end of hostilities to help restore some State authority, implement priority institution-building measures for key

institutions and resume essential services. This is essential to create an environment conducive to the success of longer-term institution-building and stabilization efforts.

V. Risks

35. In planning for future United Nations engagement in Libya, there are a number of risks to take into consideration that could undermine the Organization's efforts and limit its impact. The risks include the following:

(a) The critical first step of ending the conflict does not materialize and Libya collapses further into a complete civil war;

(b) One or several of the parties refuse dialogue and call for foreign military intervention, which might be supported by some external actors;

(c) The ability of the United Nations to work is contingent on basic security conditions which the Libyan authorities prove unwilling or unable to provide;

(d) Security conditions prohibit deployments inside Libya, limiting the Organization's ability to deal with day-to-day issues and reduce tensions in a timely manner;

(e) The United Nations is perceived as losing its impartiality, thereby becoming part of the conflict dynamic;

(f) Support from international actors that encourages and/or enables the parties to pursue military victory, thus undermining the work of the United Nations;

(g) The United Nations is not ready to scale up its engagement when needed.

VI. Recommendations on the United Nations configuration

36. To maximize the chances of success, it will be critical for the future United Nations presence to focus on a clear and limited list of tasks based on the priorities identified above. Aligning the mandate of the Mission and the relevant work of the United Nations country team with the identified priorities will ensure increased capacity to focus on a few critical tasks, while other activities are put on hold until the circumstances become more auspicious. It is also important to ensure that the presence of the United Nations is structured in the most efficient manner and is adequately resourced.

37. The change of focus would entail a considerable reduction in the size of UNSMIL. Given the new environment in which it operates and based on a realistic assessment of what it will be able to achieve in this context, the Mission should be reduced substantially, while it refocuses its capacity on the tasks described above.

38. Most Libyan interlocutors have noted the need for the United Nations to return to Libya as soon as possible. However, the logistical and security resources required for the Organization to be able to operate from secured premises and move around safely render a full return unrealistic until conditions change. In addition, the added value of a full return would be limited in the current circumstances and the United Nations presence on the ground while conditions are not conducive would devalue the currency of its presence. Therefore, the full return of the United Nations to

Libya is not recommended at this stage. The presence and mobility of United Nations staff in Libya will be reviewed regularly through the existing security coordination mechanism.

39. However, the Organization should be able to operate in Libya to complete critical tasks in support of its strategic priorities, including maintaining a link and active engagement with its local counterparts in anticipation of a full return when conditions permit. The best option would be a limited but continuous footprint in Libya, with a rotation of 15 to 20 substantive staff from across the United Nations system according to needs and strategic and operational priorities, with an appropriate logistical and security support component. Tripoli would be considered the forward base of the United Nations operations, with a temporary headquarters in Tunis until it is assessed that a larger United Nations presence can safely and productively return to Libya. Mission support services would continue to be derived from the Global Service Centre in Brindisi.

40. Such an approach would require UNSMIL to relinquish existing facilities in Tripoli since they are unsustainable from a security perspective. This, in turn, will have an impact on the ability of the Mission to rapidly establish larger permanent facilities that comply with minimum operating security standards to accommodate a full return once the decision is made.

41. In order to remain operational and efficient with a limited presence in the country, the support concept for the Mission should be designed to enable the mobility of my Special Representative and personnel of UNSMIL and the United Nations country team. The goal should be a nimble, flexible United Nations presence able to go quickly where it is needed and adapt to evolving tasks. This would entail travel in and out of Libya as needed, but also within the country to handle priorities in the east, west and south of the country. It would require dedicated aviation support for the mediation effort and a robust air bridge between Tunis and Tripoli for operational and security purposes pending the resumption of commercial alternatives or the full return of the United Nations to Libya. This would be supplemented by travel by road from Tunisia and Egypt, as well as from Tripoli.

42. Even with a limited presence in Libya, it will be necessary to re-evaluate the types of protection provided to UNSMIL and the country team so that staff can move around and engage with key partners and beneficiaries. Future United Nations operations in Libya will therefore require a considerably enhanced security presence (not in real terms but in proportion to the numbers to be deployed inside Libya at any given time), with the ability to cope with direct and determined threats, including from extremist groups. The deployment of staff to Libya and the allocation of resources to enable United Nations operations must be prioritized based on programme criticality and reflective of the urgent priorities of the United Nations system as a whole. At the same time, the United Nations will have to constantly reassess the risks related to its presence in Libya to determine whether the arrangements in place need to be revised.

43. While the current political and security situation limits the scope of United Nations engagement in Libya, it is essential that the progress made by the Organization so far is sustained and that the Organization maintains readiness to be able to re-engage at short notice. This will require continuing knowledge of the situation and contacts on the ground, as well as an understanding of the needs of the population. UNSMIL will require capacity to monitor, assess and plan for a larger

United Nations engagement in support of building national capacity once the political and security situation permits.

44. Part of maintaining readiness is the ability to scale up quickly to support Libya in implementing agreements and confidence-building measures or respond to a prioritized need. This may involve, for example, assistance in the monitoring or supervision of ceasefires, assistance to key institutions and facilities or assistance in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to places where reliable guarantees of safe access have been provided. Towards this end, it will be important to put in place mechanisms with the necessary flexibility to increase staffing and operations at short notice. An integrated planning cell should be established, tasked with maintaining awareness and preparedness for possible scale-ups, with the ability to mobilize expertise across the United Nations system and from key partners, including the management of up-to-date rosters in specialized areas.

45. However, readiness and the ability to scale up should not entail resuming previous activities and returning to business as usual. There is a need to "press the reset button" for both UNSMIL and the United Nations country team and recalibrate activities in order to increase the relevance of the United Nations and the pace with which it responds to the new realities in Libya. The transition from long-term capacity-building to providing an immediate response will be critical on all fronts. In addition, it will be essential for the United Nations system as a whole to work under a common strategy to deliver collectively on the above priorities. This will require common understanding and analysis of the situation and better information-sharing, not least to ensure the situational awareness necessary to operate in a volatile environment. For this purpose, a joint mission analysis cell should be established.

46. With revised priorities, there is a need to review the division of labour between UNSMIL and the country team based on their comparative advantages and mandates. UNSMIL should operate at the strategic level, in close consultation and coordination with the country team, with a focus on the aforementioned critical priorities. This would necessitate keeping broad expertise to support my Special Representative in his mediation efforts. It will also be important to ensure that his mediation team includes planners to advise on the technical aspects of implementing any agreements to enable step-by-step progress in the political dialogue process to be accompanied by step-by-step planning for implementation. At the same time, programmatic and operational tasks should be delivered chiefly by United Nations agencies, funds and programmes (as and when conditions permit), working in partnership with the Mission, as well as by qualified international and national partners. In the area of rule of law, the global focal point arrangements would be used. Whatever specific distribution of tasks will be agreed, it will be critical to establish strong coordination mechanisms within the United Nations at all levels.

47. Continuation of the existing integration arrangements (Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator)) is useful at this point because of shared security assets; shared analysis and context awareness; and mutually reinforcing support to access and engagement. However, regular review of the shifting realities on the ground and their impact on the perception of the Mission, and the United Nations as a whole will be necessary, taking into account the need for a clear distinction between the political process and humanitarian/development responses and the resulting required support structure. In

this respect, complementary capacity may be needed to support the effective undertaking of the resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator functions.

48. If the situation of competing institutions continues to exist, the United Nations should engage with its counterparts on all sides, as required, for operational purposes. This is true not only for mediation and facilitation but also for humanitarian and development work. This does not entail any formal recognition by the United Nations.

VII. Observations

49. Four years after the revolution, Libya's transition process hangs in the balance. The aspirations of the revolution remain largely unfulfilled. The road map for a democratic transition has not been completed and a coherent vision for the future of the country, including the use of its considerable financial assets, does not exist. A dangerous power struggle within Libya has deepened the political, social, economic and geographic divisions. The control of much of the country by heavily armed militias, the indiscriminate use of heavy weaponry in civilian areas, the curtailment of fundamental freedoms and rights, and disregard for the institutions and services built so far, have left Libyans with a deep sense of frustration, a longing for security and stability and waning confidence in the political process.

50. The situation in Libya has fundamentally changed since the establishment of UNSMIL in 2011 and it has considerably deteriorated over the past six months. On the basis of the findings of the strategic assessment, it is recommended that the United Nations adapt to this new reality by establishing a nimble, flexible presence focused on a clear and limited list of tasks. The recommendation to reduce the size of UNSMIL does not mean the United Nations is disengaging from Libya. On the contrary, I believe that by refocusing our priorities we will be able to maximize our impact on the most urgent priorities, while progress in those areas will in turn pave the way for increased engagement in the future. I therefore recommend that members of the Security Council consider giving UNSMIL a mandate focused on support to the political process, protection, support to key institutions, support for the provision of essential services and coordination. In support of these priorities, the division of labour between UNSMIL and the United Nations country team should be based on their respective comparative advantages.

51. At the same time, it will be critical for the United Nations to remain prepared to increase engagement in other areas when the circumstances permit and in response to the expressed needs of Libyans. This ability to respond quickly to developments on the ground will be challenging for the Organization, but I am committed to finding ways for the United Nations to be more flexible and responsive. In order to maintain preparedness, I recommend a capacity within UNSMIL dedicated to ensuring that we are able to respond promptly to demands from Libyan parties.

52. While I am recommending a limited footprint in Libya, it is critical to ensure that the Organization becomes more mobile and can travel in and out of the country, as well as within Libya where the needs are. This will require dedicated aviation support for the mediation effort and a robust air bridge between Tunis and Tripoli. In addition, the United Nations will only be able to have an impact on the ground if we are able to operate with adequate security. In this regard, I call on all Libyan

parties to enable the work of the United Nations by ensuring that its personnel can move around freely and securely.

53. These recommendations assume that the situation will improve or remain as it is. However, if mediation efforts fail and the situation further deteriorates, the Security Council has options at its disposal, in the framework of current resolutions, for other actions that may be considered appropriate.

54. The building of the Libyan State will only succeed if the Libyan authorities take full ownership. In this regard, I encourage them to take full advantage of the work of the United Nations and partners by identifying clear and reliable focal points and capacities for each institution, accepted across the Government, as the entry point for international assistance. United Nations and international efforts require predictable and committed Libyan interlocutors.

55. The challenges facing Libya need to be confronted with a heightened sense of urgency, first and foremost by the Libyans, but also by the United Nations and by the regional and international partners of Libya. The stability and security of Libya will not only affect Libya, but also neighbouring countries and regions, as well as international peace and security. Assisting the Libyans in getting the democratic process back on track should therefore remain a priority for the international community. The United Nations will be prepared to play its role, but Member States must also revisit their commitments to Libya. All of those who helped Libyans to overcome the Qadhafi regime now have a continued responsibility to help complete the transition and also be ready for "the day after" a political agreement is attained. In this regard, ensuring sufficient resources will be critical.

56. I wish to thank my Special Representative, Mr. Bernardino León, as well as the staff of UNSMIL and the United Nations country team for their continued hard work in uncertain and sometimes dangerous circumstances, as well as for their support to the strategic assessment process. I also thank all Libyan stakeholders who shared their views with the United Nations during this review process and international partners for their continued support.

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Angola, Chad, Chile, France, Jordan, Lithuania, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions, statements of its President and press statements on the situation in Guinea-Bissau, in particular resolutions 1876 (2009), 2030 (2011), 2048 (2012), 2092 (2013), 2103 (2013), 2157 (2014) and 2186 (2014),

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on Guinea-Bissau, dated 19 January 2015 (S/2015/37) and the recommendations contained therein, and *commending* the engagement of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS),

Taking into consideration the recommendation of the Secretary-General to reinforce the role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in assisting the Government of Guinea-Bissau through the use of the good offices, and in continuing to coordinate international support,

Welcoming the progress made by Guinea-Bissau, recognizing the concrete steps taken by the Government towards peace, security and stability in the country, by continuing to take steps towards the Reform of the Security Sector, tackling corruption through the reinforcement of the judicial system, improving public administration and State revenue's management, as well as the supply of basic services to the population, and *commending* its commitment to the implementation of its national priorities,

Welcoming the establishment of the Peace and Stability Commission by the National Assembly, which constitutes a concrete step towards the establishment of a nationally owned reconciliation process, while *recognizing* the need for UNIOGBIS to support national efforts to maintain constitutional order and to promote a multi layered national dialogue towards peace and reconciliation,

Emphasizing the need for respect of democratic principles and *stressing* the importance of national reconciliation, inclusive dialogue and good governance, essential for the attainment of lasting peace in Guinea-Bissau, *further stressing* the importance of including all Bissau-Guineans in this process at national and local levels, while upholding the principles of separation of powers, rule of law, justice and combating impunity, and *encouraging* all stakeholders to engage in the process,

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Stressing that the consolidation of peace and stability in Guinea-Bissau can only result from a consensual, inclusive and nationally owned process, respect for constitutional order, priority reforms in the defence, security and justice sectors, the promotion of the rule of law, the protection of human rights, the promotion of socioeconomic development and the fight against impunity and drug trafficking,

Underscoring the importance of the Government of Guinea-Bissau, with the support of UNIOGBIS and international partners, to continue developing national security and rule of law institutions that are transparent, accountable and professional,

Stressing that all stakeholders in Guinea-Bissau should work to ensure short, medium and long-term stability through clear commitment and genuine inclusive political dialogue aimed at creating conditions conducive to finding viable and sustainable solutions to the country's social, economic, political and military problems, which would facilitate the implementation of key reforms and the strengthening of State institutions,

Noting efforts of the government to gain effective civilian control and oversight over the defence and security forces, as failure to do so could adversely affect the effective functioning of State institutions, as a result of collusion between some political actors and the military leadership,

Commending the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in helping to sustain peace, security and development and to support the security sector reform (SSR) process in Guinea-Bissau namely through the activities of its Mission (ECOMIB),

Welcoming the continued contribution of ECOMIB in ensuring an environment that enables the implementation of critical reforms in the defence and security sector and *encouraging* the international community to support the continuation of such efforts,

Reiterating its call on the Government of Guinea-Bissau to conduct transparent, independent and credible investigations into all alleged human rights violations and abuses, in accordance with international standards, and to hold those responsible accountable for their actions,

Reiterating its concern at the threat posed by drug trafficking and related transnational organized crime to peace and stability; and, in this regard, *welcoming* the efforts of the Government of Guinea-Bissau to update the three-year national plan for combating drug trafficking and organized crime prepared in June 2011, and to define new priority areas accordingly,

Re-emphasizing the need to tackle the problem of drug trafficking in the countries of origin, transit and final destination on a basis of a common and shared responsibility, to tackle the world drug problem and related criminal activities; and, in this regard, *stressing* the need for increased coherence, coordination and efficiency among relevant partners to enhance their collective efforts, in particular through sharing of information,

Reiterating the importance and urgency of the continued evaluation capacity and support provided by the relevant United Nations (UN) entities and international, regional, subregional and bilateral partners for the long-term security and development of Guinea-Bissau, particularly towards the implementation of security

and justice sectors reforms, the fight against drug trafficking, transnational organized crime and human trafficking, as well as the creation of an enabling environment for good governance and inclusive and sustainable social development, and in this regard, *commending* the important work of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in collaboration with relevant UN entities in Guinea-Bissau and the subregion, and *encouraging* enhanced cooperation between UNODC and UNIOGBIS,

Underlining that any lasting solution to instability in Guinea-Bissau should include concrete actions to fight impunity and ensure that those responsible for politically motivated assassinations and other serious crimes such as breaches of constitutional order and drug trafficking-related activities are brought to justice, including through national judicial mechanisms,

Emphasizing the important role of women in prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding, as recognized in resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013) and 2122 (2013), *welcoming* the cooperation between UNIOGBIS, National authorities and civil society organizations to increase women's participation in Guinea-Bissau and underlining that a gender perspective must continue to inform the implementation of all relevant aspects of the mandate of UNIOGBIS,

Welcoming the establishment of a national technical commission with a focus on responsible extraction and exploitation of natural resources for inclusive growth and development,

Reaffirming that Guinea-Bissau's partners should continue to actively and closely coordinate their actions in support of the Government's efforts to address the country's political, security and development challenges, and in this regard, *welcoming* the coordinated support provided by the country's partners, namely those in the UN system, the European Union, the World Bank, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the Community of Portuguese Countries and the African Development Bank, to the Government to organize the International Donor Conference for Guinea-Bissau on 25 March 2015 in Brussels and *taking note* of the 9 February final communiqué of the Preparatory Meeting on Guinea-Bissau International Donors' Conference in Accra, Ghana,

Taking note of the statement made by the Chair of the Guinea-Bissau Configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) on 5 February 2015 and *welcoming* the continued engagement of the PBC with Guinea-Bissau,

Emphasizing the importance of preventing the further spread of the Ebola Virus Disease, including to Guinea-Bissau and the need for ongoing preparedness efforts to build domestic capacity to fight further transmission of the Disease,

Reaffirming its full commitment to the consolidation of peace and stability in Guinea-Bissau,

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNIOGBIS for a period of 12 months beginning on 1 March 2015 until 29 February 2016;

2. *Expresses* its strong support for the key role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Guinea-Bissau, and requests UNIOGBIS, including through the use of the good offices and political support of the Special Representative, to focus, in particular, on the following priorities:

(a) Support an inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation process to strengthen democratic governance and work towards consensus on key political issues particularly with regards to the implementation of necessary urgent reforms;

(b) Provide strategic and technical advice and support to national authorities and relevant stakeholders, including in coordination with ECOWAS/ECOMIB and other international partners, in implementing the national security sector reform and rule of law strategies, as well as developing civilian and military justice systems that are compliant with international standards;

(c) Support the Government of Guinea-Bissau towards the mobilization, harmonization and coordination of international assistance, including for the implementation of the national security sector reform and rule of law strategies, and enhancing cooperation with the African Union (AU), ECOWAS, the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), the European Union (EU) and other partners in support of the maintenance of constitutional order and the stabilization of Guinea-Bissau;

3. *Also affirms* that UNIOGBIS and the Special Representative will continue to lead international efforts in the following priority areas:

(a) Provide support to the Government of Guinea-Bissau in strengthening democratic institutions and enhancing the capacity of state organs to function effectively and constitutionally;

(b) Provide strategic and technical advice and support for the establishment of effective and efficient law enforcement and criminal justice and penitentiary systems, capable of maintaining public security and combating impunity, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms;

(c) Assisting national authorities in the promotion and protection of human rights as well as undertaking human rights monitoring and reporting activities;

(d) Provide strategic and technical advice and support to the Government of Guinea-Bissau to combat drug trafficking and transnational organized crime, in close cooperation with UNODC;

(e) Provide support to the Government of Guinea-Bissau to incorporate a gender perspective into peacebuilding, in line with Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008); as well as implementation of the National Action Plan on Gender in order to ensure the involvement, representation and participation of women at all levels through inter alia the provision of gender advisers;

(f) Work with the Peacebuilding Commission in support of Guinea-Bissau's peacebuilding priorities;

4. *Calls upon* the authorities of Guinea-Bissau and all stakeholders, including the military, political parties, and civil society to work together to consolidate progress made so far, and to address the root causes of instability with particular attention to political-military dynamics, ineffective state institutions and rule of law, impunity and human rights violations and abuses, poverty and lack of access to basic services;

5. *Reiterates* its demand to the security and defence services to submit themselves fully to civilian control;

6. *Takes note* of the evolving human rights situation in the country and *urges* the authorities of Guinea-Bissau to take all necessary measures to protect human rights, put an end to impunity, initiate investigations to identify the perpetrators of human rights violations and abuses, including those against women and children; and bring them to justice and take action to protect witnesses in order to ensure due process;

7. *Welcomes* the joint efforts by international partners, in particular the UN, AU, ECOWAS, the EU and CPLP, to enhance cooperation in support of the government in Guinea-Bissau and *encourages* them to continue to work together towards the country's stabilization in accordance with the priority structural reforms established by the government;

8. *Recognizes* the commencement of the implementation of defence and security sector reforms and *encourages* the continuation of such efforts as a crucial element for long-term stability in Guinea-Bissau and *further encourages* coordinated action by all relevant subregional, regional and international partners of Guinea-Bissau in this field in order to obtain expeditious and positive results;

9. *Recognizes* the important role of ECOMIB in securing the state institutions and in supporting SSR, *supports* its continuation, in accordance with the expressed will of the authorities of Guinea-Bissau and *encourages* the support of the international community to it, as requested by the Heads of State of ECOWAS in its 46th Ordinary Summit;

10. *Calls upon* the authorities of Guinea-Bissau to continue to actively reform and strengthen the judicial system, while ensuring the separation of powers and access to justice for all citizens;

11. *Calls upon* the authorities of Guinea-Bissau to review, adopt and implement national legislations and mechanisms to more effectively combat transnational organized crime, in particular drug trafficking and money-laundering, and in this context, to provide additional support to the Transnational Crime Unit (TCU) established under the West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI) and the Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA); and *urges* the authorities of Guinea-Bissau to demonstrate full commitment to combating drug trafficking;

12. *Encourages* members of the international community to enhance cooperation with Guinea-Bissau, in order to enable it to ensure control of air traffic and surveillance of maritime security within its jurisdiction, in particular to fight drug trafficking and organized crime, as well as illegal fishing in Guinea-Bissau's territorial waters and exclusive economic zone and other cases of illegal exploitation of natural resources;

13. *Encourages* international bilateral and multilateral partners to continue their technical support to Guinea-Bissau in strengthening efforts to tackle transnational organized crime including illicit activities, such as money-laundering and drug trafficking, *calls upon* them to increase their support to WACI and the TCU to fight transnational organized crime and drug trafficking, which threaten security and stability in Guinea-Bissau and in the subregion and *further encourages* them to contribute to support the presence of UNODC in Guinea-Bissau and to the UNIOGBIS Trust Fund for immediate, medium and longer-term priorities, including for post-election reforms;

14. *Stresses* the importance of combating drug trafficking to achieve political and economic stability in Guinea-Bissau, *requests* the Secretary-General to ensure the relevant capacity within UNIOGBIS, continuing to provide an anti-drug component, including appropriate expertise, and *further requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to increase efforts to achieve greater coherence, coordination and efficiency among relevant UN agencies, funds and programmes in the country to maximize their collective effectiveness, in particular through provision by these agencies, funds and programs of relevant information to the Special Representative on individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with drug trafficking that contribute to creating a threat to the peace, stability and security of Guinea-Bissau and the subregion;

15. *Commends* the good offices role of the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General to support the Government of Guinea-Bissau, and *invites* the Secretary-General to reinforce UNIOGBIS' capacities in this regard and to continue strengthening the coordination for international support;

16. *Welcomes* the convening of an international donor conference in Brussels in March 2015 and *strongly encourages* the international community to support Guinea-Bissau in mobilizing resources to implement Government priorities and start the long term work of stabilizing the country in order to move it towards sustainable development and also *encourages* UNIOGBIS to assist in the coordination of international assistance to the Government of Guinea-Bissau in its fight against poverty;

17. *Welcomes* Guinea-Bissau's steps in building domestic capacity to prevent transmission of the Ebola Virus disease, and *encourages* the continuation of efforts aimed at further developing national capacities and practices for prevention of and response to the disease;

18. *Requests* the Secretary-General submit to the Council regular reports every six months on the implementation of this resolution and submit a report within six months to the Committee established pursuant to its resolution 2048 (2012) on the progress made with regards to the stabilization of the country and restoration of constitutional order and recommendations on the continuation of the sanctions regime in the post-election environment, in line with paragraph 12 of resolution 2048 (2012);

19. *Decides* to review the sanctions measures established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) seven months from the adoption of this resolution;

20. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2015/115

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 February 2015

Original: English

Identical letters dated 13 February 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am writing to draw your attention to an alarming development in our region. Hamas is once again preparing to go on the offensive by rearming, rebuilding its terror infrastructure and reaffirming its commitment to waging war against Israel.

Hamas has been working around the clock to rebuild its weapons production and military capabilities. The internationally recognized terrorist group is determined to attack Israel by land, air and sea. On 19 January 2015, the Israeli navy intercepted a vessel headed to Gaza and carrying materials and parts for rocket and mortar production.

Instead of reconstructing Gaza, Hamas is reconstructing its terror infrastructure and has test fired approximately 90 rockets from Gaza into the Mediterranean Sea since December. The terrorist group is aggressively taxing the people of Gaza and directing hundreds of millions annually towards rebuilding its terror activities rather than towards the humanitarian needs of the Palestinian people in Gaza.

Hamas is also vigorously working to reconstruct its terror tunnels. These tunnels are used to conduct incursions into Israeli territory and carry out attacks against Israeli civilians. These tunnels are intentionally built beneath civilian facilities such as homes, mosques and schools.

Senior Hamas officials such as Mahmoud Al-Zahar openly boast about the non-stop work taking place to repair the tunnel systems, declaring: "Nothing can stop the process of preparing for the next confrontation [with Israel]". Since the summer, Hamas has recruited, indoctrinated and trained 2,500 young adults between the ages of 14 and 20 to build a "popular army" that integrates civilians in Hamas fighting terrorist units.

There is no doubt that Hamas is preparing for another confrontation. Israel cannot be expected to stand by as its soldiers and citizens are repeatedly put at risk. I urge the Security Council to address this issue immediately, before the situation escalates further.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ron **Prosor**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

15-01995 (E) 180215

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United Nations S/2015/116

Security Council

Distr.: General
15 February 2015

Original: English

Angola, Chad, France, Jordan, Lithuania, Malaysia, New Zealand, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 2014 (2011), 2051 (2012) and 2140 (2014) and presidential statements of 15 February 2013 and 29 August 2014,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen, and its commitment to stand by the people of Yemen,

Supporting the efforts of the Gulf Cooperation Council and commending its engagement in assisting the political transition in Yemen,

Deploring the unilateral actions taken by the Houthis to dissolve parliament and take over Yemen's government institutions, which have seriously escalated the situation, *expressing alarm* at the acts of violence committed by the Houthis and their supporters, which have undermined the political transition process in Yemen, and jeopardized the security, stability, sovereignty and unity of Yemen,

Emphasizing that the political transitional process agreed upon by the parties in the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue conference, and the Peace and National Partnership Agreement has been undermined,

Expressing grave concern that the Houthis are holding Yemeni government officials, including President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, Prime Minister Khalid Bahah and members of the Cabinet, under house arrest,

Expressing grave concern over reports of the use of child soldiers by Houthi forces, Ansar Al-Sharia, and government forces,

Underscoring the importance of all parties allowing all Yemenis to assemble peacefully without fear of attack, injury, arrest, or retaliation,

Noting the formidable economic, security and social challenges confronting Yemen, which have left many Yemenis in acute need of humanitarian assistance,

Emphasizing the need for the return to the implementation of the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism and the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue conference, including drafting a new constitution, electoral reform, the holding of a referendum on the draft constitution

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and timely general elections, to avoid further deterioration of the humanitarian and security situation in Yemen,

Reiterating the need for comprehensive, independent and impartial investigations consistent with international standards into alleged human rights violations and abuses in line with the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue Conference, the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, to ensure full accountability,

Stressing that the solution to the situation in Yemen is through a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led political transition process that meets the legitimate demands and aspirations of the Yemeni people for peaceful change and meaningful political, economic and social reform, as set out in the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and Implementation Mechanism, the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue Conference, and the Peace and National Partnership Agreement, and in this regard *reaffirms* its full support for, and commitment to, the efforts of the Special Advisor of the Secretary-General on Yemen, Mr. Jamal Benomar,

Condemning the growing number of attacks carried out or sponsored by Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and expresses its determination to address this threat in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law including applicable human rights, refugee and humanitarian law, and in this regard, through the Al-Qaida sanctions regime administered by the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and *reiterates* its readiness, under the above-mentioned regime, to sanction further individuals, groups, undertakings and entities who do not cut off all ties to Al-Qaida and associated groups,

Expressing concern at the ability of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula to benefit from the deterioration of the political and security situation in Yemen, mindful that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivation, whenever, wherever and by whomsoever committed,

Recalling its determination in resolution 2140 (2014) that the situation in Yemen constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Strongly deplores* actions taken by the Houthis to dissolve parliament and take over Yemen's government institutions, including acts of violence;

2. *Reiterates* its call for all parties in Yemen to adhere to resolving their differences through dialogue and consultation, reject acts of violence to achieve political goals, and refrain from provocation and all unilateral actions to undermine the political transition;

3. *Expresses grave concern* over the takeover by the Houthis of state media outlets and rejects the use of the media to incite violence;

4. *Strongly calls upon* all parties, in particular the Houthis, to abide by the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue conference, and the Peace and National Partnership Agreement and its security annex, which provide for a Yemeni-led democratic transition;

5. *Urges* all parties, in particular the Houthis, to accelerate inclusive United Nations-brokered negotiations, to continue the political transition in order to reach a consensus solution in accordance with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, the outcomes of the comprehensive National

Dialogue conference, and the Peace and National Partnership Agreement and its security annex, and to implement it;

6. *Urges* all parties to agree upon and announce publicly dates for completing the constitutional consultation process, to hold a referendum on the constitution, and to conduct elections under the new electoral law pursuant to the new constitution;

7. *Demands* that the Houthis immediately and unconditionally:

(a) engage in good faith in the United Nations-brokered negotiations;

(b) withdraw their forces from government institutions, including in the capital Sana'a, and normalize the security situation in the capital and other provinces, and relinquish government and security institutions;

(c) safely release President Hadi, Prime Minister Bahah, members of the Cabinet and all individuals under house arrest or arbitrarily detained;

(d) refrain from further unilateral actions that could undermine the political transition and the security of Yemen;

8. *Demands* that all parties in Yemen cease all armed hostilities against the people and the legitimate authorities of Yemen and relinquish the arms seized from Yemen's military and security institutions, in accordance with the Peace and National Partnership Agreement and its security annex;

9. *Calls on* all member States to refrain from external interference which seeks to foment conflict and instability and instead to support the political transition;

10. *Calls on* all parties to abide by commitments to ensure the security of the diplomatic community and its premises;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his good offices role, *notes* with appreciation the work of his Special Adviser, Jamal Benomar, *stresses* the importance of the United Nations close coordination with international partners, including the Gulf Cooperation Council, Group of Ambassadors in Sana'a, and other actors, in order to contribute to the successful transition;

12. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to continue to coordinate assistance from the international community in support of the transition, and to propose options for strengthening the office of the Special Adviser to enable him to fulfil his mandate, including on United Nations assistance for finalizing and adopting the draft constitution, undertaking electoral reform, holding general elections, and creating mechanisms for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration as well as security sector reform;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of this resolution, and to continue to report on developments in Yemen, including on the implementation of the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue conference, and the Peace and National Partnership Agreement and its security annex within 15 days after the date of adoption of this resolution and every 60 days thereafter;

14. *Declares* its readiness to take further steps in case of non-implementation by any Yemeni party of this resolution, in particular paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 8 above;

15. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2015/117

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 February 2015

Original: English

Russian Federation: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirming its full respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine,

Expressing its grave concern at the tragic events and violence in eastern regions of Ukraine,

Reaffirming its Resolution 2166 (2014),

Firmly convinced that the resolution of the situation in eastern regions of Ukraine can only be achieved through a peaceful settlement to the current crisis,

1. *Endorses* the "Package of measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements", adopted and signed in Minsk on 12 February 2015 (Annex I);

2. *Welcomes* the Declaration by the President of the Russian Federation, the President of Ukraine, the President of the French Republic and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in support of the "Package of measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements", adopted on 12 February 2015 in Minsk (Annex II), and their continuing commitment therein to the implementation of the Minsk Agreements;

3. *Calls on* all parties to fully implement the "Package of measures", including a comprehensive ceasefire as provided for therein;

4. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

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Annex I

Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements

Minsk, 12 February 2015

1. Immediate and comprehensive ceasefire in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine and its strict implementation as of 15 February 2015, 12 a.m. local time.

2. Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides by equal distances in order to create a security zone of at least 50 km wide from each other for the artillery systems of calibre of 100 and more, a security zone of 70 km wide for MLRS and 140 km wide for MLRS "Tornado-S", Uragan, Smerch and Tactical Missile Systems (Tochka, Tochka U):

- for the Ukrainian troops: from the de facto line of contact;
- for the armed formations from certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine: from the line of contact according to the Minsk Memorandum of Sept. 19th, 2014;

The withdrawal of the heavy weapons as specified above is to start on day 2 of the ceasefire at the latest and be completed within 14 days.

The process shall be facilitated by the OSCE and supported by the Trilateral Contact Group.

3. Ensure effective monitoring and verification of the ceasefire regime and the withdrawal of heavy weapons by the OSCE from day 1 of the withdrawal, using all technical equipment necessary, including satellites, drones, radar equipment, etc.

4. Launch a dialogue, on day 1 of the withdrawal, on modalities of local elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation and the Law of Ukraine "On interim local self-government order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions" as well as on the future regime of these areas based on this law.

Adopt promptly, by no later than 30 days after the date of signing of this document a Resolution of the Parliament of Ukraine specifying the area enjoying a special regime, under the Law of Ukraine "On interim self-government order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions", based on the line of the Minsk Memorandum of September 19, 2014.

5. Ensure pardon and amnesty by enacting the law prohibiting the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.

6. Ensure release and exchange of all hostages and unlawfully detained persons, based on the principle "all for all". This process is to be finished on the day 5 after the withdrawal at the latest.

7. Ensure safe access, delivery, storage, and distribution of humanitarian assistance to those in need, on the basis of an international mechanism.

8. Definition of modalities of full resumption of socioeconomic ties, including social transfers such as pension payments and other payments (incomes and

revenues, timely payments of all utility bills, reinstating taxation within the legal framework of Ukraine).

To this end, Ukraine shall reinstate control of the segment of its banking system in the conflict-affected areas and possibly an international mechanism to facilitate such transfers shall be established.

9. Reinstatement of full control of the state border by the government of Ukraine throughout the conflict area, starting on day 1 after the local elections and ending after the comprehensive political settlement (local elections in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions on the basis of the Law of Ukraine and constitutional reform) to be finalized by the end of 2015, provided that paragraph 11 has been implemented in consultation with and upon agreement by representatives of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group.

10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, as well as mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine under monitoring of the OSCE. Disarmament of all illegal groups.

11. Carrying out constitutional reform in Ukraine with a new constitution entering into force by the end of 2015 providing for decentralization as a key element (including a reference to the specificities of certain areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, agreed with the representatives of these areas), as well as adopting permanent legislation on the special status of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in line with measures as set out in the footnote until the end of 2015. [Note]

12. Based on the Law of Ukraine "On interim local self-government order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions", questions related to local elections will be discussed and agreed upon with representatives of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group. Elections will be held in accordance with relevant OSCE standards and monitored by OSCE/ODIHR.

13. Intensify the work of the Trilateral Contact Group including through the establishment of working groups on the implementation of relevant aspects of the Minsk agreements. They will reflect the composition of the Trilateral Contact Group.

Note

Such measures are, according to the Law on the special order for local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions:

- Exemption from punishment, prosecution and discrimination for persons involved in the events that have taken place in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions;
- Right to linguistic self-determination;
- Participation of organs of local self-government in the appointment of heads of public prosecution offices and courts in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions;

- Possibility for central governmental authorities to initiate agreements with organs of local self-government regarding the economic, social and cultural development of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions;
- State supports the social and economic development of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions;
- Support by central government authorities of cross-border cooperation in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions with districts of the Russian Federation;
- Creation of the people's police units by decision of local councils for the maintenance of public order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions;
- The powers of deputies of local councils and officials, elected at early elections, appointed by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by this law, cannot be early terminated.

Participants of the Trilateral Contact Group:
Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini
Second President of Ukraine, L. D. Kuchma
Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Ukraine, M. Yu. Zurabov
A.W. Zakharchenko
I.W. Plotnitski

Annex II

Declaration of the President of the Russian Federation, the President of Ukraine, the President of the French Republic and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in support of the "Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements", adopted on 12 February 2015 in Minsk

The President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, the President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, the President of the French Republic, François Hollande, and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Angela Merkel, reaffirm their full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. They firmly believe that there is no alternative to an exclusively peaceful settlement. They are fully committed to undertake all possible individual and joint measures to this end.

Against this background, leaders endorse the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements adopted and signed on February 12, 2015 by all signatories who also signed Minsk Protocol of September 5, 2014 and Minsk Memorandum of September 19, 2014. Leaders will contribute to this process and will use their influence on relevant parties to facilitate the implementation of that Package of Measures.

Germany and France will provide technical expertise for the restoration of the segment of the banking system in the conflict affected areas, possibly through the establishment of an international mechanism to facilitate social transfers.

Leaders share the conviction that improved cooperation between the EU, Ukraine and Russia will be conducive to the crisis settlement. To this end, they endorse the continuation of trilateral talks between the EU, Ukraine and Russia on energy issues in order to achieve follow-up stages to the gas winter package.

They also support trilateral talks between the EU, Ukraine and Russia in order to achieve practical solutions to concerns raised by Russia with regards to the implementation of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement between Ukraine and the EU.

Leaders remain committed to the vision of a joint humanitarian and economic space from the Atlantic to the Pacific based upon full respect for international law and the OSCE principles.

Leaders will remain committed to the implementation of the Minsk Agreements. To this end, they agree to establish an oversight mechanism in the Normandy format which will convene at regular intervals, in principle on the level of senior officials from the foreign ministries.

United Nations S/2015/118

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 February 2015

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (covering the period from 18 November 2014-10 February 2015)

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2187 (2014), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) until 30 May 2015 and requested that I report on the implementation of the Mission's mandate by no later than 16 February 2015. The report provides an update to my previous report (S/2014/821), dated 18 November 2014, covering developments from that date to 10 February 2015.

II. Political developments

South Sudan peace process

2. It will be recalled that at the sixth Summit of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Heads of State and Government, held in Addis Ababa on 6 and 7 November 2014, the participants demanded that the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Opposition end all hostilities and, should the parties fail to do so, threatened collective punitive action by the States of the IGAD region, including sanctions and an arms embargo. The parties were further granted 15 days to consult their respective constituencies on the core issues impeding progress in the negotiations.

3. The core outstanding issues included: the formula for power-sharing between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and SPLM/A in Opposition during a transitional period leading to elections; the timing of the integration of armed forces; and the timing of the consideration of federalism. The power-sharing formula has been the most contentious issue.

4. Government consultations were held in Juba on 24 November. On the issue of power-sharing, the Government concluded that executive power during the transition should remain with the President and his Vice-President, offering SPLM/A in Opposition a position of Prime Minister without executive power. It further recommended that the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of opposition forces be completed before the end of a pre-transition period of three months, and that deliberations on a federal system of governance be held through the constitution-making process during the transition.

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5. SPLM/A in Opposition held consultations from 6 to 12 December in Pagak, Upper Nile State. It concluded that an executive Prime Minister from SPLM/A in Opposition should lead the transitional Government, with a ceremonial head of state; that the Government and SPLM/A in Opposition should maintain separate armies throughout the transitional period until the holding of elections; and that South Sudan should be immediately reorganized as a federation of 21 States. The positions of the two sides reflected some backtracking and hardening of previously held negotiation positions, particularly with respect to power-sharing.

6. On 18 December, the negotiation committees on leadership, security arrangements, and economic, wealth sharing, and public finance management, resumed talks in Addis Ababa, with limited results. The IGAD Special Envoys adjourned the talks on 21 December in order to consult IGAD Heads of State and Government and other partners in preparation for an IGAD Summit to be held in the margins of the African Union Summit in January 2015.

7. On 12 January, during a visit to Sudan, the Foreign Minister of China hosted a meeting in Khartoum between the representatives of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and SPLM/A in Opposition. The parties agreed to a "Five Point Plan", which provided that they: (a) immediately work to stop hostilities; (b) speed up the pace of negotiations towards a transitional government; (c) implement all signed agreements in good faith; (d) take concrete steps to relieve the humanitarian situation in conflict-affected areas; and (e) ensure the safety of personnel and assets of international entities operating in South Sudan.

8. From 9 to 19 January, a second round of the intra-SPLM party dialogue was convened in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, facilitated by the ruling party of the country, Chama Cha Mapinduzi. On 21 January, in the presence of regional leaders, including the Presidents of the United Republic of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, and the Deputy President of South Africa, President Kiir, Riek Machar and Deng Alor Kuol signed an Agreement on the Reunification of SPLM. Under the agreement, the parties agreed: to uphold the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and to use the intra-SPLM party dialogue and IGAD mediation process to conclude a peace agreement; to reform and transform SPLM, including through promoting tolerance and political pluralism; and to implement a programme for national unity, peace, reconciliation, justice and accountability.

9. From 28 to 31 January, President Kiir and Riek Machar met in Addis Ababa for direct negotiations, particularly on the issue of power-sharing. While the consultations failed to deliver an agreement, on 1 February, the two leaders signed a document entitled "Areas of Agreement on the Establishment of the Transitional Government of National Unity in the Republic of South Sudan". The document recommits the parties to previously signed agreements, including the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement of 23 January 2014 and its implementation matrix, and, in an annex, outlines areas of agreement and disagreement on the way forward. In particular, the document confirms the parties' agreement to establish a transitional government by 9 July 2015 for a period of 30 months and to resolve all outstanding issues, including on power-sharing, by no later than 5 March.

10. Concurrently, on the margins of the African Union summit, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union held its 484th meeting, on 29 January, at the level of Heads of State and Government, on the situation in South Sudan. The African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan concluded its investigations

in September and presented its report to the Chair of the African Union Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, in November of 2014. The Chairperson of the Commission of Inquiry, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, was scheduled to present the Commission's report to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on 29 January. In the communiqué of the meeting, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union noted the completion of the Commission's work and decided to defer the consideration of its report to a later date. In addition, the Peace and Security Council reiterated its call on the parties to the conflict in South Sudan to recommit to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and to negotiate in good faith and without preconditions to establish a transitional government of national unity before the end of the 24th Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly of Heads of State and Government on 31 January. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union also reiterated its determination to impose sanctions against all parties that continue to undermine the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and obstruct the political process.

Other political developments

11. During the reporting period, the Government affirmed its intention to proceed with general elections on 30 June 2015 if the parties did not reach a peace agreement before that time. On 1 December, the National Elections Commission and political parties met in Juba to consult on the 2015 electoral calendar and party registration processes. At that time, 15 political parties issued a letter to the Chairperson of the National Elections Commission, expressing concern that the situation in the country was not conducive for the conduct of credible elections. Subsequently, on 23 December, the Council of Ministers approved a budget of 1.5 billion South Sudanese Pounds ($517 million) for the conduct of elections. On 22 January, an alliance of opposition political parties filed a lawsuit in the Supreme Court against the National Elections Commission seeking to invalidate the declaration of the date for the elections, because it violates a number of provisions in the 2011 Transitional Constitution and the 2012 National Elections Act. On 5 February, the Government declared the Political Parties Council formally opened, requiring political parties to register within a 90-day period, in accordance with the 2012 Political Parties Act.

12. According to media reports, on 21 December, Riek Machar announced the establishment of a parallel Government in Opposition, abolishing the current system of 10 states and replacing it with 21 states under a federal system. Since that time, he has appointed several Governors to the new federal states and named a six-member General Chiefs of Staff command with 12 commanders for newly created military regions.

13. Since my latest report, the operationalization of the Greater Pibor Administrative Area in Jonglei State has made no tangible progress. The budget approved by the Government in October 2014 has not been released, and the demarcation of the borders of the Greater Pibor Administrative Area has not yet commenced. Nevertheless, with regard to the disarmament of the South Sudan Democratic Movement/South Sudan Defence Army (SSDM/SSDA)-Cobra faction, led by David Yau Yau, on 27 January, the armed group released the first group of 249 of an expected 3,000 children identified for reintegration (see para. 51 below).

III. Security situation

A. Security developments

14. Despite their repeated pledges to end the fighting, the two parties continued sporadic military engagements in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile States. On 6 February, the IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism released the latest summary of violations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, totalling 26 violations since its deployment on 1 April 2014. Ten of the violations were attributed to SPLA and 12 to SPLM/A in Opposition, while four were attributed to both parties.

Upper Nile State

15. The security situation remained volatile during the reporting period, with repeated clashes between SPLA and SPLM/A in Opposition forces, particularly in Nassir and Renk counties. Fighting between armed youth aligned with the Opposition and SPLA occurred on 20 November and 10 December, and on several occasions between 29 December and 3 January, particularly in and around Nassir. On 3 January, SPLA repulsed the armed youth to Kedbek, east of Nassir. The SPLA took control of Kedbek on 12 January.

16. On 20 November, SPLM/A in Opposition reportedly attacked an area 40 kilometres south of Renk town, but were repulsed by SPLA. On 10 December, 17 and 26 January, SPLM/A in Opposition briefly took control of villages in northern Renk County, near the border with Sudan, before withdrawing. On 18 and 19 January, UNMISS heard shelling between SPLM/A in Opposition-held areas in Manyo County and Renk town, which remains under SPLA control. In Maban County, clashes between SPLA and SPLM/A in Opposition occurred on 24 November and on 8 and 9 January. Tensions also rose in Maban County in early January between SPLA and the Maban Defence Force (a local pro-SPLA armed group) reportedly owing to the latter's reluctance to integrate into SPLA, with the Maban Defence Force commanders and senior officers replaced with SPLA commanders. The Maban Defence Force also clashed with Opposition forces in southern Maban County on 24 January. On 19 and 23 December, exchanges of shellfire were reported in Panyikang County. The situation in Ulang and Baliet counties remained tense.

Unity State

17. Major tensions continued in areas north and south of the state capital, Bentiu, with skirmishes concentrated around the oilfields in Unity State and in Pariang County. On 18 November, the SPLA regained control of the oilfields in Unity, 27 kilometres north of Bentiu in Rubkona County, which had been contested since mid-September. In early January 2015, however, SPLA and SPLM/A in Opposition forces reportedly exchanged fire around the oilfields in Unity State. Fighting also reportedly occurred south and south-east of Bentiu in Guit and Rubkona counties between 6 and 12 January. On 21 and 22 January, clashes were reported in Pariang County, with SPLA repulsing the Opposition northwards. On 30 January, UNMISS received reports of clashes between SPLA and SPLM/A in Opposition near the border between Mayom and Rubkona counties, west of Bentiu.

Jonglei State

18. SPLA and SPLM/A in Opposition clashed in Fangak and Pigi counties in the north-western part of Jonglei State between 27 November and 10 December and again on 19 and 23 December, resulting in the reported displacement of thousands of civilians. Each party controls parts of Pigi County, with SPLA reportedly in control of New Fangak, in Fangak County.

Western Bahr el-Ghazal State

19. The situation in Raga County has been tense throughout the reporting period. Reports indicate that in early January, approximately 30 Nuer soldiers deserted from SPLA at Boro Medina and Raga towns in Raga County. The group has been blamed for four ambushes that took place between 15 and 25 January, resulting, inter alia, in the injury of the Raga County Commissioner and up to 11 people killed.

Eastern Equatoria State

20. Tensions briefly rose in mid-December following the defection of SPLA Commander Major General Martin Kenyi, an ethnic Maadi from the Nimule area, and claims were made that Kenyi and forces loyal to him were responsible for an ambush of two trucks on the Juba-Nimule road on 15 December. On 21 December, Riek Machar appointed Martin Kenyi as SPLM/A in Opposition's Deputy Chief of Staff for Moral Orientation and the commander of SPLM/A in Opposition's "Eastern Equatoria Forces". In January, SPLA and personnel of the National Security Services detained Maadi and Acholi youth in Pageri, Magwi County, on suspicion of sympathizing with Kenyi and SPLM/A in Opposition.

Intercommunal conflict

21. The onset of the dry season contributed to an escalation in intercommunal violence, particularly in Lakes State and the Equatorias. In Lakes State, intercommunal conflict between Dinka-Agar subsections continued, despite efforts at the national and State levels to stem the violence. In the most significant incident of intercommunal fighting, in Rumbek East on 27 December, up to 48 people were killed. Government efforts to transition law enforcement responsibility in the State back to the national police from SPLA, which was deployed as a temporary mitigation measure to strengthen the weak presence of the national police in the State, have had limited success. Moreover, the State-sponsored civilian disarmament campaign is yet to take place amidst a continuing influx of weapons.

22. In Eastern Equatoria State, a cattle raid in Torit County on 6 December left 28 people dead. On 19 January, conflict between the Bari and Mundari tribes in Juba County, Central Equatoria State, over cattle grazing on Bari farms, resulted in 11 people killed and Bari homes destroyed. Meanwhile, in Western Equatoria State, the influx of Dinka pastoralists from Lakes and Jonglei states displaced local farmers from the eastern counties.

B. Regional dimensions of the conflict

23. Regional involvement in the conflict continued during the reporting period with the presence of a number of non-South Sudanese militia groups in the border

areas between Sudan and South Sudan (Western Bahr el-Ghazal, Unity and Upper Nile States), including cadres belonging to SPLM-North, Justice and Equality Movement and Sudan Liberation Army factions. In December, media outlets reported a warning from the National Security Director of Sudan, that, if required, the Government would pursue Sudanese armed groups into South Sudanese territory. On 30 December, an unidentified aircraft, reported by local authorities to be a Sudan Armed Forces aircraft, bombed Deim Jalab in Raga County. Seven civilians were killed and two others were injured. In the meantime, the Ugandan Peoples Defence Force remains deployed in South Sudan, particularly in Bor and Juba, in support of the Government. On 3 February, Uganda and the Government of the Republic of South Sudan signed an agreement to extend Uganda's military presence for a further four months.

IV. Humanitarian situation

24. Persistent insecurity continued to cause displacement, heightened risk of disease and disruption of livelihoods. As of 4 February, 1.5 million people had been internally displaced. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), South Sudanese continue to flee to neighbouring countries, bringing the total number of South Sudanese refugees to nearly 500,000 since the crisis began. Approximately 112,900 internally displaced persons are also sheltered in UNMISS bases, up from 100,000 reported during the last reporting period. Aid agencies have reached 4.9 million people, exceeding the 3.8 million people targeted in 2014. The full needs of those assisted have yet to be met.

25. Owing to continuing displacement and insecurity, crop planting in crisis-affected states is lower than usual. This will have an impact on overall food production and will lead to faster stock depletion. From January to March 2015, some 2.5 million are likely to face severe food insecurity. This situation is expected to deteriorate until July. While the majority of affected people are in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile States, approximately 1 million food insecure people are outside conflict areas, half of them in Lakes and Northern Bahr el-Ghazal States. The conflict has also caused unprecedented displacement of millions of cattle from conflict-affected areas into areas of mostly agricultural lands in Greater Equatoria, Greater Bahr el-Ghazal, and north-eastern Upper Nile State. This, in turn, has affected local power structures, the availability of natural resources, and livestock disease patterns. Malnutrition rates of children under the age of 5 are already at critical or serious levels, with global acute malnutrition levels above 15 per cent. Around 235,000 children remain at risk of severe acute malnutrition in conflict-affected areas of Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile States as well as high burden areas of Northern Bahr el-Ghazal and Warrap States. In 2014, over 93,204 children under the age of 5 were reached with treatment for severe acute malnutrition across the country.

26. Viral leishmaniasis disease remained a concern, as it reached its seasonal peak. As of 4 February, a total of 8,543 cases and 229 deaths had been reported, with figures for the first five weeks of 2015 higher than those in the same period in 2014. Children between the ages of 5 and 17 were disproportionately affected. HIV/AIDS was among the leading cause of mortality among displaced persons, owing mainly to disrupted treatment or limited access to health care. Partners continued to combat

disease with an integrated campaign targeting children under 5 years of age. In round three of the National Immunization Days completed in November, 2.4 million children were vaccinated against polio and 1.7 million against measles, mostly in non-conflict-affected States. A Short Interval Additional Dose campaign is now ongoing in the conflict-affected States of Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile, with trivalent oral polio vaccine targeting 2.5 million children up to 15 years of age for each round of the campaign.

27. The Crisis Response Plan for 2014 was 78 per cent funded as of 4 February, with more than $1.4 billion secured out of the requirement of $1.8 billion. The humanitarian community has now launched the Humanitarian Response Plan for 2015, appealing for $1.8 billion to reach 4.1 million people with assistance. Of this amount, $600 million is required by the end of February to take advantage of the current dry season, during which aid agencies can pre-position supplies to deliver lifesaving and livelihood assistance later in the year when roads again become impassable. The South Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund has allocated $60 million to aid agencies to kick-start the 2015 response.

28. Active hostilities and insecurity, especially in the greater Upper Nile region, as well as continued insecurity in large parts of Lakes State, did at times disrupt humanitarian response activities and restrict road and air access for humanitarian agencies. Violence against aid workers, facilities and assets were registered. Seven humanitarian staff members were detained for approximately two weeks when they landed at Juba International Airport in December, coming from an area controlled by SPLM/A in Opposition. One humanitarian worker was detained in territory controlled by SPLM/A in Opposition and released later on the same day. There were at least 13 cases of robbery and looting during the reporting period, with unknown actors responsible, likely linked to a rise in common criminality.

V. Implementation of the Mission's reprioritized mandated tasks

A. Protection of civilians

29. UNMISS continues to pursue a three-tiered strategy to protect civilians. Under the first tier, protection through conflict resolution, UNMISS continued to promote locally owned interventions to address intercommunal violence. In this regard, in December, UNMISS assisted authorities and traditional leaders in Lakes State to address intercommunal violence between Dinka clans, including through the provision of advice on the identification of 1,500 youth tasked to mitigate tensions within their communities by identifying perpetrators of crime and dissuading cattle camp youth from engaging in raiding activity. Also in December, in the Greater Pibor Administrative Area, UNMISS conducted conflict resolution workshops to assist traditional and youth leaders in preventing conflict between Murle and Lou-Nuer youth in Jonglei State. In Western Equatoria State, UNMISS facilitated the organization of a state peace conference between indigenous farmers and migrant pastoralists. The conference resulted in the signing of an agreement on 17 January that provides for the return of migrant pastoralists to their home states by 9 February, under SPLA guard. During the reporting period, UNMISS implemented 42 community-based workshops across the 10 states of South Sudan

that provided assistance to 1,575 civilians in the development of conflict management skills and in the prevention and mitigation of disputes.

30. Under tier two, provision of physical protection to civilians under imminent threat of violence, UNMISS continued to provide protection to about 112,900 internally displaced persons at seven protection of civilians sites, including over 53,000 in Bentiu, 35,000 in Juba and 21,000 in Malakal. While some internally displaced persons have left the protection of civilians sites, insecurity resulted in new influxes into the sites in some areas.

31. Intercommunal tensions, a growing number of community leadership struggles, increased youth radicalization, the use of alcohol and drugs, as well as threats against humanitarian service providers continue to pose serious challenges in many of the UNMISS protection of civilians sites. Of particular concern is the high incidence of use by women and adolescent girls of unsafe traditional methods to terminate unwanted pregnancies.

32. A total of 364 security incidents were recorded in the UNMISS protection of civilians sites during the reporting period, with theft, assault, disorderly conduct and fighting the most prevalent. Between 25 and 30 incidents were related to sexual, gender-based and domestic violence, including rape. UNMISS and humanitarian actors assisted the victims with access to health and psychological services. UNMISS police worked to identify, locate and detain the perpetrators. During search operations, UNMISS police seized prohibited items, including firearms, machetes, knives, and drugs and alcohol, in violation of rules established for the security and safety of the protection sites. While the Mission has taken additional measures to enhance safety and optimize the response to insecurity in the sites, addressing the underlying causes and reducing the potential for conflict remains challenging.

33. Holding facilities for the temporary isolation of those suspected of committing serious crimes remained operational in Juba, Bor, Bentiu and Malakal. Since the establishment of the holding facilities in May 2014, a total of 856 offenders have been temporarily detained. Most of the offenses are being handled under community-led informal mitigation and dispute resolution mechanisms. In isolated instances, offenders were expelled from the protection sites. UNMISS continues to engage the Ministry of Justice on mutually acceptable modalities between the Mission and the Government on the handover of those suspected of committing serious crimes to national authorities for criminal prosecution. The absence of a commonly agreed framework on the transfer of suspects to national authorities poses considerable challenges to the Mission's ability to operate the holding facilities in accordance with international standards.

34. UNMISS continued to deter violence against civilians beyond UNMISS premises. The Mission deterred threats to communities through the targeted use of short- and long-range, integrated, and dismounted patrols and proactive community engagement. To increase its impact beyond UNMISS bases and ensure unimpeded and quick access to critical population centres, the Mission is assessing options for the establishment of forward operating bases in the towns of Bentiu, Malakal and Bor. In Lakes State, the Mission continued efforts to mitigate intercommunal violence, including through Human Rights Due Diligence Process cleared support to the national police, and proactive deployment of UNMISS military personnel.

35. Despite those efforts, the Mission continued to observe a lack of free and safe movement for internally displaced persons, including harassment by SPLA, SPLM/A in Opposition and national police personnel. Incidents of sexual and gender-based violence near UNMISS protection sites are reportedly often perpetrated by men in uniform. For example, in December, in a village located near the protection site in Bentiu, Unity State, three women were reportedly raped by three SPLA soldiers while they were on the way to collect firewood. Similarly, a 13-year-old girl was reportedly raped by SPLA soldiers in Pakur, Unity State. UNMISS is currently investigating those reports.

36. Under tier two, UNMISS has begun to provide technical support, in line with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, to a pilot initiative by the Inspector General of Police aimed at improving the security environment in selected neighbourhoods in Juba to facilitate voluntary returns of internally displaced persons from UNMISS protection of civilians sites. To this end, national police officers are being selected for redeployment and vetting; locations for sensitization training are being identified; sensitization material, including on community policing, sexual and gender-based violence, and international humanitarian law, is being prepared; and the first police station funded by UNMISS (under quick-impact projects) was handed over to the national police.

37. Outside of Juba, UNMISS police conducted 98 vehicle patrols in several locations, visited camps for internally displaced persons located outside of UNMISS bases and resumed routine interaction with national police in several less affected states to foster a secure environment to encourage voluntary returns. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNMISS are providing support to the national police in the vetting of personnel to carry out protection-focused tasks. In Juba, the Emergency Call Centre, which is supported by UNDP and is aimed at promoting public safety and security, received 1,867 calls (including 29 that were related to cases of sexual and gender-based violence) between 18 November and 31 December 2014. Meanwhile, at the community level, UNDP supported 14 Police Community Relation Committee meetings in Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Western Bahr el-Ghazal and Northern Bahr el-Ghazal states to encourage community involvement in addressing local security issues and support police in their efforts to protect civilians. The meetings resulted in the establishment of neighbourhood watch campaigns and the involvement of tribal chiefs in promoting security in their areas.

38. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) provided critical assistance to protect civilians from the threat of explosive remnants of war and unsafe and unsecured weapons. UNMAS conducted weapons and ammunition destruction activities in Bentiu, Bor, Juba, Malakal, Nassir, and Wau. A total of 273 small arms and light weapons were destroyed, along with 18,937 rounds of ammunition and other weapons. UNMAS increased survey, clearance, and risk education activities with the deployment of 15 additional mine action teams. Despite notable progress in the removal of explosive remnants of war, two new caches of anti-personnel mines as well as man-portable air defence systems and anti-tank mines were identified in the Bentiu area. In coordination with local military authorities, UNMAS destroyed the anti-personnel mines as well as the man-portable air defence systems, anti-tank mines, and other explosive remnants of war. In total, UNMAS released 2,597,835 square metres of safe land, and destroyed 435 landmines, 5,894 items of unexploded ordnance and 60,592 items of small arms

ammunition, assessed 600 kilometres of roads, and provided risk education to 50,460 civilians in the period from 18 November 2014 to 31 January 2015.

39. Under tier three, UNMISS and the United Nations country team continued to engage the parties and other protection stakeholders, such as the IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, in the creation of a protective environment that enhances the safety and supports the rights of civilians, including through advocacy for adherence to the rule of law and to human rights and international humanitarian law.

40. UNMISS and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) provided support to local counterparts to review priorities identified during a national peace forum in 2012, in support of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security and subsequent related resolutions adopted by the Security Council. The review highlighted: the high incidence of cases of sexual and gender-based violence; the insufficiency of access to justice for victims; and the low prosecution rates in South Sudan for perpetrators of crime. In this connection, the review team welcomed the completion of the National Action Plan for the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), which will be launched on 8 March, International Women's Day. During the 16 Days of Activism against Gender-Based Violence in December 2014, UNMISS, in collaboration with several partners, conducted awareness-raising activities on sexual and gender-based violence, targeting internally displaced persons, local communities, civil society and the media, among others.

41. As part of a comprehensive strategy towards the formulation of sustainable solutions for displaced persons in protection of civilians sites, UNMISS and humanitarian partners are currently assessing the security and viability for return locations identified by internally displaced persons during a biometric registration process completed last year. Upon the completion of this assessment, internally displaced persons will be offered transportation to those locations. All departures from UNMISS protection sites will be on a voluntary basis.

B. Human rights monitoring and reporting

42. On 19 December, UNMISS released a public human rights report on its investigation into the attack on 29 October 2014 against Bentiu and Rubkona in Unity State. Preliminarily findings indicate that at least 11 civilians were killed, including two women and a child, and that several women were raped by Opposition forces during the attack. On 9 January, UNMISS released a human rights report detailing investigations into attacks on civilians in Bentiu and Bor in April 2014. The report found reasonable grounds to believe that at least 19 civilians were killed at the Bentiu Civil Hospital and that approximately 287 civilians were killed in the Kalibalek mosque by Opposition forces when they temporarily gained control of Bentiu on 15 April 2014. The report also concluded that at least 47 civilians were killed when a mob attacked the UNMISS protection of civilians site outside of Bor two days later, and that in both attacks, victims were deliberately targeted on the basis of ethnicity, nationality or perceived support for one of the parties to the conflict. The report concluded that those attacks could amount to war crimes. Nearly nine months after the attacks took place, no one has been held accountable.

43. Investigations of alleged violations and abuses of human rights and humanitarian law continue in several areas of the country. UNMISS is investigating reports of an attack by SPLA on a group of traders at Tharwangiyel in Unity State on 12 December in which several people were killed. Allegations of shelling, resulting in civilian deaths and displacement and destruction of property, were also reported in the New Fangak area of Jonglei State. Continued hostilities, however, have made verification difficult.

44. Intercommunal violence continued to have a negative impact on the human rights situation, particularly in Lakes and Eastern Equatoria States. Two members of the State Legislative Assembly in Lakes State have remained in detention since 24 October, for allegedly assisting armed youth to resist Government efforts to separate two local communities to reduce violence. The detainees have not been charged with a crime or granted access to legal counsel. In Eastern Equatoria State, national police prevented UNMISS from conducting an investigation and interviewing detainees associated with an incident of intercommunal violence that occurred on 6 December in Torit County, in which several civilians were killed, including women and children. Reports received by UNMISS indicate that security forces responding to the incident had committed human rights violations, including the looting of property and acts of sexual violence against women.

45. Significant challenges persist concerning the administration of justice in accordance with international human rights standards. Cases of proxy detention, prolonged detention, detention based on actions not amounting to crimes, and detention on orders of customary courts lacking authority to do so, continued to be reported. In a few cases, the intervention of UNMISS led to the release of some detained individuals, such as in Aweil East County, Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State, where the county judge ordered the release of 25 inmates, including three women, detained on orders of customary courts.

46. Acts of intimidation, harassment and threats against media and journalists by agents of the National Security Services have continued to be reported. Allegedly, on several occasions, members of the National Security Services attempted to interfere with the content of local newspapers in Juba. In an incident on 16 December, the National Security Services reportedly confiscated 2,500 copies of the *Nation Mirror* from a distribution centre in Juba, owing to the inclusion of information about and photographs of figures of SPLM/A in Opposition. On 22 December, for similar reasons, the content of the newspaper was again questioned by officials of the National Security Services. Thereafter, on 9 January, the newspaper was temporarily closed, reportedly by personnel of the National Security Services. The paper resumed operations on 13 January. Yet another incident allegedly occurred on 16 January when the *Juba Monitor* received threats after the publication of two articles that were deemed to be critical of the Government. The National Security Services reportedly granted the newspaper a reprieve after receiving an apology for printing the articles in question. On 3 February, personnel of the National Security Services again ordered the closure of the *Nation Mirror*, alleging that it issued "anti-government publications", in relation to a reported misprint in an article published on 28 January, discussing skirmishes in Renk County, Upper Nile State, which suggested that SPLA had withdrawn from Renk.

47. No major accountability measures appear to have been taken by national actors with regard to alleged violations of human rights and humanitarian law

committed during the conflict. In December, senior officials of the Presidential Committee on Human Rights Abuses informed UNMISS that it had submitted a report on its investigations to the President. In addition, a national police investigation committee had also submitted its investigation reports to the Presidential Committee for consideration. SPLA reported on 17 December that 41 soldiers had been disciplined, including one who had been sentenced to death for murder, in connection with violations committed in December 2013 and January 2014. The majority of those disciplinary measures comprised dismissals for desertion, while the death sentence for murder involved the ethnically motivated killing of a soldier by a fellow soldier.

48. With regard to the development of a legal framework supporting the promotion and protection of human rights, on 16 December, President Kiir returned the National Security Service Bill to the National Legislative Assembly for further amendment. Concerns were cited regarding the bill's compatibility with the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan (2011) and the Penal Code Act (2008). The bill also appears to fall short of several international standards, including on procedural safeguards surrounding detention.

49. During the reporting period, members of the Country Task Force on the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on grave violations committed against children by all parties to the conflict, including the recruitment and use of children, recorded a total of 46 incidents, affecting 859 children (534 boys and 325 girls). Of the 46 incidents, 12 were verified, affecting 659 children (349 boys and 310 girls).

50. At present, 33 schools in South Sudan are being used for military purposes; the United Nations continues to advocate at various levels for the armed actors to vacate the schools. Meanwhile, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and implementing partners identified and registered 128 unaccompanied children, who are now receiving family tracing and reunification services. Since the outbreak of the conflict, a total of 7,116 children have been registered as either unaccompanied, separated or missing, 658 of whom have been reunited with their families. Since mid-December, more than 140,000 children have been reached with child-specific protection services.

51. On 5 December, the National Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, with support from UNICEF, organized a workshop for representatives of the Government and the SSDM/SSDA-Cobra faction, which resulted in the signing of a memorandum of understanding on the release and reintegration of the approximately 3,000 children associated with the former armed group. On 27 January 2014, the first group of 249 boys were released in Gumuruk. Families of 227 of those children have so far been traced, while the rest have been placed under interim care pending family tracing and reunification. Further release of children is expected prior to the integration of the SSDA-Cobra faction troops into SPLA.

C. Creating the conditions for delivery of humanitarian assistance

52. UNMISS continued to carry out a broad range of activities to create the conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In order to improve living and security conditions at UNMISS protection sites, the Mission has invested substantial engineering capacity and financial resources to the enhancement of existing sites and the construction of new ones, complementing the extensive

investment by humanitarian partners and the donor community. By 24 December, all internally displaced persons in the UNMISS Tomping site in Juba (approximately 20,000 people) had moved voluntarily to the new protection site near UN House in Juba. In the Malakal protection site, nearly 15,000 persons were relocated to areas with improved conditions, while construction work to further extend the new site (scheduled to be completed by the end of February), will accommodate the remaining internally displaced. While insecurity and the lack of financial and engineering resources impeded the construction of a new site in Bentiu, the necessary drainage works and expansion of the site will be carried out during the dry season.

53. The distribution of humanitarian assistance within protection sites proceeded effectively, with a few exceptions. Intercommunal tensions in the UNMISS protection of civilians site in Malakal, including violent attempts by internally displaced youth to block humanitarian assistance to specific ethnic groups, temporarily disrupted the delivery of humanitarian services in mid-November. From late November to 2 February, the World Food Programme (WFP) suspended food distribution at one of the three protection sites in Juba after humanitarian staff were assaulted. In Bentiu, the biometric registration of all 53,000 internally displaced people in the protection site, which provides the basis for the delivery of services, was concluded.

54. In Unity State, UNMAS cleared and destroyed explosive remnants of war near the Rubkona Airstrip, which serves during the rainy season as the sole logistics point for aid deliveries to internally displaced persons in the UNMISS protection site in Bentiu. Survey and clearance of the Rubkona-Pariang roads allowed for the more efficient transport of aid. Similarly, the completion of road reconnaissance operations along the Malakal-Baliet and the Malakal-Melut roads in Upper Nile State will permit UNMISS and humanitarian partners to deliver aid by road.

D. Supporting the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement

55. UNMISS continued to provide support to the IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, notably with force protection and transport for verification activities in Renk, Maban and Baliet counties in Upper Nile State, helicopter landing site reconnaissance in Jamam, Upper Nile State, and Pajut, Jonglei State, and medical evacuation exercises to promote the safety of Monitoring and Verification Teams. UNMISS also continued to provide fixed security and accommodation to the IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism Teams in UNMISS compounds in Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity states.

VI. Mission staffing and status of deployment of surge capacity

56. As at 3 February, UNMISS troop strength stood at 10,470 military personnel of the total authorized strength of 12,500. Of the remaining 2,030 to be deployed, 286 additional military personnel of the Kenyan battalion are to be deployed during March. Deployment of the battalion from China commenced in January and is expected to be completed by March. The additional 400 troops for the Ghanaian battalion are expected to be deployed by the middle of March, and the riverine unit

from Bangladesh is expected to be deployed by late May. With regard to air assets, the three military utility helicopters from Sri Lanka are expected to deploy in the beginning of March. The arrival dates of the five tactical armed helicopters from Rwanda and Ethiopia are still to be confirmed.

57. As of 3 February, UNMISS police strength stood at 1,036 of the authorized 1,323 officers, including 607 individual police officers and 429 in formed police units. The Mission will reach its full capacity of formed police unit personnel between February and March with the deployment of the three formed police units from Ghana, Nepal and Rwanda.

58. The 2014 civilian staffing review resulted in the reduction of 386 posts associated with tasks that ceased to exist following the revision of the mandate under Security Council resolution 2155 (2014). The General Assembly, in its resolution 69/260, abolished a further 24 posts, mainly in the area of mission support. This brings the total number of abolished posts in UNMISS during the year 2014 to 410. As of 3 February, the actual strength of the civilian personnel of UNMISS stood at 2,331, including 781 international staff members, 1,146 national staff members and 404 United Nations Volunteers.

59. UNMISS continued risk assessment and awareness raising activities with a view to enforcing the United Nations policy of zero tolerance towards sexual exploitation and abuse; prohibition against discrimination, harassment, sexual harassment and abuse of authority; and ensuring accountability.

VII. Violations of the status-of-forces agreement, international humanitarian law and security of United Nations staff

60. During the reporting period, UNMISS registered a total of 39 violations of the status-of-forces agreement, involving staff members, associated personnel, premises and equipment of UNMISS. Of the 39 incidents, 20 were related to restrictions of movement, affecting land, air and riverine operations. Other violations included the impound of United Nations vehicles; threats to personnel and/or premises; harassment, assault, and arrest and detention of UNMISS personnel. Of particular concern is the fact that 38 of the reported violations of the status-of-forces agreement were perpetrated by Government security forces, in particular SPLA and national security personnel. The deployment of contingent-owned equipment suffered severe delays following importation restrictions at the border and subsequent impound of UNMISS vehicles and equipment. This had a specific impact on the deployment of the Ethiopian and Kenyan contingents and resulted in severe contractual financial penalties, which by mid-January had amounted to $800,000.

61. The three national staff members who were arrested in August and October of 2014 remain in the custody of the National Security Services in Juba. While UNMISS has regular access to the detainees and is monitoring their well-being, the Government has yet to notify the Mission of the outcome of investigations or of the charges levied against them.

62. The UNMISS national independent contractor, abducted on 10 October while working at the UNMISS air terminal in Malakal, Upper Nile State, as well as a staff member of a United Nations agency who was abducted from Malakal airport on

16 October, both of Nuer ethnicity, remain missing. An UNMISS internal investigation report has recently found that elements of the former Shilluk militia group led by Major General Johnson Olony was responsible for the abduction of the UNMISS independent contractor. However, Major General Olony has denied the allegation. All other efforts by UNMISS to ascertain the fate or whereabouts of the abducted independent contractor have failed to achieve any result.

63. UNMISS continued to formally notify the Government on a regular basis of these violations through notes verbales and meetings with senior government officials. The monthly matrix of incidents is also shared with the Government. Despite those efforts, the Government has not revealed to the Mission the outcome of any of the investigations it has committed to undertake.

VIII. Financial aspects

64. The General Assembly, by its resolution 69/260, appropriated the amount of $1,097,315,100 for the period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015. As at 10 February 2015, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNMISS Special Account amount to $479.1 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at the same date amount to $2,735.2 million. As at 10 February 2015, reimbursement of troop-contributing governments for troop and contingent-owned equipment costs has been made for the period to 31 August 2014 and 30 June 2014, respectively, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

IX. Observations and recommendations

65. Over one year into the conflict in South Sudan, and despite the efforts and demands of the international community, the Government and SPLM/A in Opposition continue to engage in hostilities on the ground, while making little meaningful progress towards a political resolution of the crisis. Developments on the ground are increasingly worrisome, with all signs indicating that both parties to the conflict have not given up the military option. There is a risk that armed conflict could intensify, especially around the oil fields, as well as spread, particularly to the Greater Bahr el-Ghazal and the Equatorias, which have not been directly affected by the conflict, as each side seeks to consolidate and strengthen its position at the negotiating table. The impact on the economy of the continuing conflict is seriously weakening the social fabric of South Sudan. Moreover, increasing involvement of regional players and the potential of the conflict to spill across borders cannot be discounted. I appeal, once again, to both parties to stop the violence immediately and to implement fully the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. Every additional day of fighting further exacerbates the indescribable conditions faced by the people of South Sudan.

66. I wish to thank all international peace partners, including the IGAD mediators, IGAD Heads of State, the Troika States, China, the United Republic of Tanzania, South Africa, the African Union, and the European Union for their sustained efforts to keep the parties engaged in peaceful dialogue. The Chinese-led initiative on 12 January, in Khartoum, to bring the warring factions together to forge a common objective of bringing peace to South Sudan was encouraging. The Agreement on the Reunification of SPLM by the three factions on 21 January 2015, in Arusha, United

Republic of Tanzania, is also a positive step. It was my hope that those initiatives would have generated the momentum and created the political space for the leadership of South Sudan to conclude a peace agreement during the IGAD Summit, which was to be held in the margins of the African Union Summit. Regrettably, South Sudan's leaders wasted yet another opportunity to make peace. Nevertheless, their public acknowledgment, on 1 February, of areas of agreement with respect to the establishment of a transitional government of national unity, and their commitment to resolve all outstanding issues, including power-sharing, by no later than 5 March, and begin a transitional phase of governance by 9 July, provides hope for the long sought resolution of the conflict. I call on President Kiir and Riek Machar not to miss another opportunity to bring peace to South Sudan.

67. As I have said repeatedly, the primary responsibility for resolving the conflict in South Sudan rests with its leaders. I urge the parties to spare no effort and make the necessary compromises to conclude a peace agreement that addresses the root causes of the crisis. The agreement must provide a foundation for badly needed national, political, security and economic reform, justice and accountability, and reconciliation and healing to rebuild their fledgling nation, which has been torn apart by this conflict. The international community must also seriously reflect on its responsibilities. Now is the time for the international community to act with one voice and impress upon the leaders of South Sudan that they can no longer hold the fate of the country hostage to their personal ambitions and that there are consequences for those who continue to undermine the peace effort.

68. I urge the parties to the conflict, in particular the Government, which has the primary responsibility to protect civilians, to establish a secure environment for civilians and create the conditions necessary for the voluntary return of internally displaced persons. I also renew my earlier calls for troop-contributing countries to expeditiously deploy the remaining surge capabilities and military equipment, which are critical to enable UNMISS to conduct its mandated tasks effectively.

69. For peace to be sustainable in South Sudan, it is crucial that the perpetrators of human rights violations and abuses during the conflict are held accountable. However, as I have noted in the present and previous reports, there has been little in the way of national accountability measures for human rights violations committed to date. Peace and justice are not mutually exclusive. I therefore urge the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to urgently consider the report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan and its recommendations. In the meantime, in accordance with the Security Council's request for accountability in its resolution 2178 (2014), I have asked the Secretariat to develop possible options for the establishment of criminal accountability and transitional justice processes for South Sudan, based on past experiences, to address the gravity and scope of the serious human rights atrocities committed in the country since the beginning of the crisis.

70. I am increasingly disturbed by the continued access challenges faced by humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel, as well as the insecurity and violence, including harassment, threats, physical assault, arrest, detention and abductions, they face while carrying out their duties. I am deeply concerned by the abduction and disappearance of an UNMISS independent contractor and a staff member of a United Nations agency, and the continued arbitrary detention of three national staff

members of UNMISS. I call on the Government to ensure their immediate release without harm.

71. In November and December, UNMISS faced increased restrictions imposed by the Government on the importation and movement of essential contingent-owned equipment belonging to its troop contributors. I remind the parties that such impediments on UNMISS and humanitarian personnel hinder the Mission's ability to implement its mandate and carry out vital humanitarian and protection related operations. I reiterate my call to both sides to ensure unfettered freedom of movement and humanitarian access for UNMISS and humanitarian workers and to remove all restrictions that undermine their ability to implement their mandates.

72. Finally, I wish to express my sincere appreciation for the courage and sacrifice of UNMISS personnel, who, under the able leadership of my Special Representative, Ellen Margrethe Løj, continue to work to protect tens of thousands of civilians under threat of physical violence and stabilize the security situation. In particular, I thank the troop- and police-contributing countries that have provided much-needed uniformed personnel and assets to the Mission. I also commend the personnel of the United Nations country team and non-governmental organization partners for their tireless efforts to provide much needed humanitarian assistance to the population, under often arduous and dangerous conditions.



Map No. 4456 Rev. 15 UNITED NATIONS
February 2015 (Colour)

Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

United Nations S/2015/119

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 February 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 17 February 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to resolution 2196 (2015), by which the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic for a period of 13 months.

Accordingly, I wish to inform you that, after consulting the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic, I have appointed the following experts:

Ms. Mélanie De Groof, arms (Belgium)
Mr. Paul-Simon Handy, regional (Cameroon)
Mr. Ruben de Koning, finance/natural resources (Netherlands)
Mr. Aurélien Llorca, armed groups (France)
Ms. Carolina Reyes Aragón, humanitarian (Colombia)

I have designated Mr. Llorca to serve as Coordinator of the Panel.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Please recycle

United Nations S/2015/120

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 February 2015

Original: English

Note verbale dated 17 February 2015 from the Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Executive Office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and has the honour to attach herewith a letter dated 17 February 2015 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt, H.E. Mr. Sameh Shokry, to the Secretary-General regarding the recent developments and current situation in Libya (see annex).

The Permanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt requests that the present note and its annex be circulated to all members of the Security Council as a document of the Council.

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Annex to the note verbale dated 17 February 2015 from the Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]

You are no doubt aware of the deplorable incident in which 21 young Egyptians were killed on the beaches of Sirte by the barbaric organization known as Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This incident made every Egyptian feel that our country is facing an unprecedented aggression from its western border.

For some time, Egypt has been monitoring with increasing concern the extremely dangerous developments in the security situation in Libya. The Egyptian Government agrees with the legitimate Government of Libya that the ongoing activities of terrorist organizations and extremist groups in Libya are a grave threat to international peace and security. Accordingly, the response to those activities must not contribute to the perpetuation of instability and violence in Libya. The current situation is undermining the authority of the State and the elected Government; threatening the sovereignty of Libya, its territorial integrity and unity; and jeopardizing regional security, particularly in view of the rise in acts of violence and terrorism against the interests of foreign states and foreign nationals, who are being targeted systematically. I am also certain that you took note of the fact that the videotape of the killing of the Egyptian nationals was a message that was not directed to the Egyptian people alone. The perpetrators considered it a bloody message to Christians in general and they deliberately killed those Egyptians simply because they were adherents of the Christian faith.

I therefore felt it necessary to write to you in view of the authority that you have in relation to the maintenance of international peace and security. The scope of acts of terrorism in Libya and their frequency is increasing because the Libyan national army continues to lack the military capabilities to counter terrorism and prevent it from spreading beyond Libya's borders. We fear that this threat might increase if the current situation was to continue and the restrictions on the provision of weapons to the legitimate Libyan Government were to remain in place. Meanwhile, armed militias cunningly obtain weapons by illegal means that are contrary to Security Council resolutions.

I should like to draw your attention in particular to a number of risk factors that now threaten Egyptian national security and regional security, and have implications for international security. Following are some examples of those risk factors:

- Terrorists might use Libyan territory as base from which to carry out operations in Egypt and other States that neighbour Libya, and then return to their bases in order to prepare for other operations. There is also the risk presented by the presence of foreign fighters in Libya;
- Increased pressure on the Libyan Government and Army will weaken them and limit their ability to be a partner in the regional and international war against terrorism and ISIL;
- Transnational organized crime, including the smuggling of weapons and trafficking in persons and narcotics, may rise and illegal migration to northern

Mediterranean States may increase. That would contribute to an increase in acts of violence and terrorism in Mediterranean States;

- The ISIL presence in Libya is helpful to ISIL in Iraq and Syria. In their statements, some of that organization's leaders have stated that their presence in Libya alleviates the pressure on their forces in the eastern Arab world. Giving ISIL free rein in Libya will increase its ability to fight in Iraq and Syria. Extremist groups in Libya, through their alliances with Boko Haram and other groups in Africa, are also a threat to the strategically important Sahel region;

- Attached is a list of the most significant acts of violence that have occurred in Libya since October 2013.

The locus of terrorist activities in Libya are extremist groups that have been implicated in acts of violence directed against the Libyan people's security, Libyan State institutions, the interests of neighbouring States and diplomatic missions. The most significant of the groups are ISIL and Ansar al-Sharia, which are included in the sanctions list maintained by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, as well as Al Qaida and several Libyan militias known for espousing violent ideology. The latter falsely claim they are Islamic, yet they systematically commit acts of terrorism that are planned and supported by outside parties.

I think you will agree with me that it is imperative to respond resolutely to the spread of terrorism in Libya and the transformation of Libyan territory into a haven, in the heart of the civilized world, for terrorist organizations. We must act in order to ensure that this matter does not get completely out of hand and difficult for the international community to resolve. Egypt has taken the initiative and acted based on its responsibilities as a State that upholds international peace and security, and as a member of the international alliance against terrorism. It therefore desires the support of the Security Council, in accordance with the Council's responsibilities.

I therefore call on you to urge the Security Council to act resolutely and forcefully in its meeting today, 18 February, regarding this matter, so as to enable the legitimate Government to take those measures that would enable it to establish security and combat terrorism, including providing its army with appropriate weapons. The Council should also act to prevent weapons from reaching illegal militias and support those States that wish to assist the Libyan Government in shouldering its responsibilities to counter terrorism, in cooperation with the Government and with its consent. I should also be grateful if the present letter could be circulated to the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Sameh Hassan Shokry **Selim**
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt

Nr.	*Date*	*Organization or entity*	*Type of attack*	*Nationality of target*	*City*	*Description of attack*
1.	5 October 2013	Al-Faruq Battalion	Armed attack	Libyan	Tarhunah	16 Libyan Army soldiers were assassinated after dawn prayers at the Malti Gate on the road between Tarhunah and Bani Walid. The Al-Faruq Battalion from Misrata has been blamed for the attack and has not denied its involvement.
2.	20 November 2013	Unknown	Killing of demonstrators	Libyan	Tripoli	Mass demonstrations in Tripoli calling for militias to leave the capital came under fire. 47 people were killed in the ensuing clashes.
3.	22 November 2013	Unknown	Murder	Libyan	Darnah	The secretary of the council of notables, elders and sheikhs was assassinated in Darnah.
4.	25 November 2013	Ansar al-Sharia	Combat operations	Libyan	Benghazi	Ansar al-Sharia clashed violently with Libyan Army special forces over several days. Seven people were killed and some 50 others injured. Following the clashes, unidentified persons attacked the Army several times, killing more than 10 people.
5.	27 November 2013	Ansar al-Sharia	Vandalism/ assassination	Libyan	Darnah	The Murad Agha Mausoleum in Tajura' was blown up and two members of the special forces were assassinated in Darnah.
6.	28 November 2013	Unknown	Closing of embassies	Western embassies	Tripoli	At least four embassies, namely those of Britain, France, Malta and Greece, closed their offices in the Tripoli Tower.
7.	2 December 2013	Unknown	Killing of demonstrators	Libyan	Benghazi	An armed group met demonstrators with a hail of bullets, wounding five people. The group, which has not been officially identified, is probably affiliated with the extremist Ansar al-Sharia organization.
8.	3 December 2013	Unknown	Abduction	Libyan	Al-Kufrah	Unidentified persons abducted five Libyan Army soldiers.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
9.	5 December 2013	Unknown	Assassination	United States of America	Tripoli	Four unidentified individuals opened fire from a vehicle on Ronnie Smith, a teacher from the United States of America, killing him instantly.
10.	7 December 2013	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Benghazi	A car bomb seriously wounded a high-ranking official of the National Security Agency in Benghazi, eastern Libya.
11.	8 December 2013	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Benghazi	A car bomb killed one person and injured five others in Benghazi, eastern Libya. According to a security official, the car bomb went off as mourners were leaving the funeral of Kamal Bazazah, a colonel in the National Security Agency. Most of the victims were senior security officials.
12.	11 December 2013	Unknown	Abduction	Libyan	Darnah	A Libyan parliamentarian was kidnapped.
13.	20 December 2013	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Benghazi	Unidentified armed individuals assassinated the officer responsible for military intelligence in Benghazi.
14.	23 December 2013	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Benghazi	In a suicide attack, a vehicle packed with explosives was driven into the Barsis Gate, east of Benghazi, killing 13 special forces soldiers and wounding more than 10 others.
15.	29 December 2013	Unknown	Siege	Libyan	Tripoli	Protesters demanding the removal of Ali Zeidan, head of the Transitional Government of Libya, surrounded Government headquarters and forced a number of Government offices and ministries in Tripoli to close for several hours. They remained closed until Libyan Army units were deployed in the city. No clashes took place between the two sides.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
16.	4 January 2014	Unknown	Assassination	British/ New Zealand	Sabratha	The bodies of a British and of a New Zealand national were found on the beach near Melita, west of Sabratha. Both had gunshot wounds.
17.	9 January 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Sirte	Hasan al-Dru'i, Deputy Minister of Industry and a former member of the Transitional National Council in Sirte was assassinated. He was shot several times by unidentified individuals while returning to his home in the second residential district of the city.
18.	16 January 2014	Unknown	Siege	Libyan	Tripoli	Armed individuals opened fire on the General National Congress (parliament) building in Tripoli. They also surrounded the building and prevented General National Congress members from leaving, following members' failure to agree to remove Ali Zeidan, head of the Transitional Government, from his post.
19.	19 January 2014	Unknown	Abduction	South Korean	Tripoli	Han Seok-Woo, a South Korean diplomat and the head of the Libya unit of the Korean Trade-Investment Promotion Agency was abducted.
20.	26 January 2014	Libya Revolutionaries Operation Room	Abduction	Egyptian	Tripoli	Five Egyptian diplomats were kidnapped in Tripoli following the arrest in Alexandria of Sha'ban Hidayah, (known as Abu Ubaydah al-Zawi), leader of the Libya Revolutionaries Operation Room.

No.	*Date*	*Organization or entity*	*Type of attack*	*Nationality of target*	*City*	*Description of attack*
21.	24 February 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Egyptian	Benghazi	The bodies of seven Egyptian Christian workers who had been shot dead were found in Benghazi, eastern Libya. Preliminary investigations conducted by the Egyptian and Libyan authorities indicate that the seven Egyptians had been deliberately taken from their homes and executed.
22.	27 February 2014	Unknown	Siege	Moroccan	Tripoli	The Moroccan Consulate General in Tripoli came under armed attack.
23.	27 February 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Benghazi	Armed individuals assassinated a Libyan Army officer in Garden City, Benghazi.
24.	27 February 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Sirte	Makhluq al-Farjani, a member of the Sirte branch of the Supreme Security Committee was murdered.
25.	27 February 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Darnah	Unidentified individuals bombed a perfume store in the centre of the city. There were no victims.
26.	27 February 2014	Libya Shield Force	Assassination	Libyan	Sirte	Members of the Central Shield stormed the headquarters of the 21st Battalion of the Special Forces in Sirte. The Battalion's commanding officer, Colonel Jamal al-Zahawi, stated that 11 soldiers had been killed. Direct negotiations had taken place the previous night with Central Shield commanders.
27.	18 March 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Benghazi	A car bomb exploded at the main entrance of the Libyan Army base in Benghazi, eastern Libya, killing 11 soldiers and wounding 20 others. At the same time, the General National Congress was forced to suspend its session in the Tripoli parliament building owing to security warnings in the wake of attacks on several military installations.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
28.	22 March 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Tripoli	A time bomb was used to target the runway of Tripoli airport.
29.	22 March 2014	Unknown	Abduction	Tunisian	Tripoli	A Tunisian diplomat was kidnapped in Tripoli.
30.	13 April 2014	Shura Council of Tripoli Revolutionaries	Abduction	Libyan	Tripoli	Members of the Shura Council of Tripoli Revolutionaries carried out an armed attack against Prime Minister Abdallah al-Thinni, demanding that he make public what was said to be a secret agreement between the Government and the so-called Barqah Province Political Bureau to reopen closed oilfields and ports in the east of the country.
31.	16 April 2014	Libyan Islamic Fighting Group	Abduction	Jordanian	Tripoli	Masked and armed insurgents kidnapped Fawwaz al-Aytan, the Jordanian ambassador, from an area near the centre of Tripoli. Security sources stated that the family of Muhammad al-Darsi, a Libyan extremist held in a Jordanian prison, was behind the abduction, and that the perpetrators were members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
32.	17 April 2014	Unknown	Attempted Assassination	United States of America	Tripoli	A female Libyan security officer at the United States Embassy in Tripoli managed to escape from her kidnappers and reach a hospital, where she received treatment for wounds sustained as she fled.
33.	17 April 2014	Shabab al-Tawhid	Abduction	Tunisian	Tripoli	Shabab al-Tawhid, a Libyan terrorist group, kidnapped Mr. Arusi al-Qantasi, a Tunisian diplomat in Tripoli.
34.	20 April 2014	Unknown	Burglary	Portuguese	Tripoli	An attempt was made to storm and burgle the Portuguese Embassy in Tripoli.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
35.	29 April 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Benghazi	An explosion took place in front of the headquarters of the 21st Battalion (Special Forces). Two members of the Special Forces were killed and the main entrance was severely damaged.
36.	29 April 2014	Unknown	Raid	Libyan	Tripoli	Unidentified armed individuals stormed the Libyan Parliament during its evening session, which had been selecting a new prime minister. Members of parliament fled the building, and the selection of a prime minister was once more postponed.
37.	30 April 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Tripoli	A car bomb exploded on Salahuldin Road, killing one individual and wounding others.
38.	2 May 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Benghazi	A judicial police officer was murdered in Benghazi and a soldier belonging to the 133rd Infantry Battalion assigned to the Office of the Chief of Staff was wounded.
39.	2 May 2014	Unknown	Attempted Abduction	Libyan	Benghazi	Dr. Abdulhadi al-Zintani succeeded in avoiding abduction near his home in the Laythi area.
40.	2 May 2014	Ansar al-Sharia	Armed attack	Libyan	Benghazi	Clashes between the Special Forces and Ansar al-Sharia militias left nine people dead, three missing and 12 injured.
41.	2 May 2014	Unknown	Attempted assassination	Libyan	Benghazi	Tariq Najam, a security services official, survived an assassination attempt in which unidentified gunmen shot at him in the Sabiri area of Benghazi.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
42.	7 May 2014	Unknown	Raid	Libyan	Tripoli	An armed group stormed the building housing the Libyan cinematographic archives in the Zawiyat al-Dahmani area and moved the contents of the building to an unknown location. In a statement to a local news agency, the Libyan Minister of Culture, Habib al-Amin, said that the unidentified group prevented employees from entering the building.
43.	10 May 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Benghazi	Four Libyans were killed and 20 others injured during a demonstration near the military base of the Martyrs of 17 February Battalion. The demonstrators had been expressing support for the Army and the police and calling for armed militias to be disbanded.
44.	16 May 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Benghazi	Unidentified armed individuals assassinated two members of the Libyan Army Special Forces in Benghazi.
45.	16 May 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Benghazi	Unidentified armed men assassinated Shaykh Mansur Abdulkarim al-Bara'si in Benghazi.
46.	20 May 2014	Unknown	Attempted Assassination	Libyan	Benghazi	General Khalifah Haftar survived an assassination attempt when the soldiers protecting his house in Benghazi in eastern Libya were attacked by a group of unidentified assailants. The attack continued for several minutes before the assailants withdrew.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
47.	22 May 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Chinese	Benghazi	Armed individuals in Benghazi killed a Chinese engineer who had been abducted from his place of work. The Chinese embassy stated that he was one of three engineers working at a Chinese-run company who had been abducted at work. The embassy stated that he was later found with gunshot wounds and died in hospital. His colleagues were released.
48.	24 May 2014	Unknown	Missile attack	Libyan	Benghazi	Two members of one family were killed and their children injured when their house was struck by a missile. Members of a second family were injured in two attacks on the Special Forces base in Benghazi.
49.	26 May 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Benghazi	Unidentified assailants shot and killed Miftah Awad Buzayd, a prominent Libyan journalist who had criticized the Islamists, near the Tibesti Hotel in Benghazi, eastern Libya.
50.	28 May 2014	Ansar al-Sharia	Miscellaneous	Libyan	Benghazi	Ansar al-Sharia militia forces fired several missiles and mortars at the National Security Agency building in Benghazi in an attempt to free three members of their organization who had been arrested after being caught in a vehicle packed with weapons and ammunition.
51.	29 May 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Darnah	The largest shop selling perfume and women's products was bombed. There were no victims.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
52.	1 June 2014	Al-Qaida	Vandalism	Libyan	Darnah	The historic Sahaba Mausoleum in Darnah was destroyed by extremists affiliated with Al-Qaida. The mausoleum contained the remains of 70 companions of the Prophet Muhammad who had arrived in Libya with the army of Amr ibn al-'As.
53.	2 June 2014	Ansar al-Sharia/Libya Shield Force	Miscellaneous	Libyan	Benghazi	Forces loyal to the 17 February Martyrs' Brigade and the Ra'fullah al-Sahati companies, along with the Ansar al-Sharia organization and the Libya Shield Force, attacked the 21st Brigade with various types of heavy weaponry, causing numerous deaths and injuries.
54.	2 June 2014	Unknown	Attempted assassination	Libyan	Tripoli	The Libyan Army Chief of Staff Major General Abdulsalam al-Ubaydi survived an assassination attempt when unidentified men opened fire on his convoy in a Tripoli suburb.
55.	4 June 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Swiss	Sirte	The Swiss national Michael Greub, the head of the branch office of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Libya, was killed by armed men as he left a meeting in Sirte.
56.	5 June 2014	Unknown	Attempted assassination	Libyan	Benghazi	Former Major General Khalifah Haftar, the leader of Operation Karamah (Dignity) survived an assassination attempt by a suicide bomber in a Land Cruiser rigged with explosives. The attack killed five soldiers and injured 23 others.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
57.	7 June 2014	Unknown	Attempted assassination	Libyan	Tripoli	Hashim Bashar, the former head of the Security Committee in Tripoli, reported that a car bomb directly targeted the home of his father and the rest of his family, damaging dozens of homes and cars at the site of the attack.
58.	7 June 2014	Unknown	Armed operation	Libyan	Tripoli	The headquarters of the Fatwa Council in Tripoli was attacked.
59.	11 June 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Benghazi	A suicide attack involving a car bomb was carried out at the Barsas Gate east of Benghazi, killing the perpetrator and injuring five soldiers stationed at the gate.
60.	11 June 2014	Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries	Assassination	Libyan	Benghazi	The Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries carried out a surprise attack on Battalion 319, holding hostage and then killing in cold blood Libyan Army officer Adamin al-Tawarghi and six battalion members. Their bodies were mutilated and their pictures posted on a social network along with pictures of the leaders of the Shura Council and the Ansar al-Sharia organization.
61.	13 June 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Marj	Unidentified men shot and killed the preacher of a mosque in Al-Salam area as he left the mosque after leading Friday prayers.
62.	23 June 2014	Unknown	Armed attack	Libyan	Benghazi	Armed men attacked the joint operations room in front of the Benghazi Port Gate, killing four people and injuring 15.
63.	25 June 2014	Ansar al-Sharia	Assassination	Libyan	Benghazi	The prominent human rights activist Salwa Buqu'ayqays was assassinated in Benghazi.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
64.	26 June 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Bayda	A car bomb exploded in front of the old Parliament hall in Bayda. The Constitution Drafting Assembly has been using the hall as its headquarters. There were no casualties.
65.	1 July 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Benghazi	Musa al-Majbari, an officer in the Army's Preventive Security Unit, was assassinated. A security official stated that the armed men intercepted him and riddled him with bullets.
66.	3 July 2014	Unknown	Threats	Libyan	Tripoli	The Libyan Minister of Culture Al-Habib Al-Amin reported that he had received explicit death threats from an armed group that had raided his home in Tripoli, ransacked his belongings and shot at him.
67.	4 July 2014	Unknown	Abduction	Libyan	Tripoli	Shaykh Fariq Ahmad Abbasi, the imam of a Tripoli mosque, was abducted.
68.	6 July 2014	Unknown	Threats	Libyan	Tripoli	Some Sufi elders in Libya reported that they had received threats of abduction from extremist Islamist groups.
69.	11 July 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Benghazi	Unidentified individuals assassinated Colonel Tawfiq al-Shaykhi from the office of the Libyan Army Chief of Staff.
70.	17 July 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Darnah	Unidentified individuals assassinated Fariha Muhammad al-Barkawi, a member of the General National Congress of Darnah, opening fire on her vehicle near Abu Bakr al-Siddiq Mosque, which is located in the vicinity of her home.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
71.	18 July 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Tripoli	A car bomb exploded in front of the Al-'Aqm centre in the Gharghur area near the checkpoint belonging to the first company of the Third Brigade under the Office of the Chief of Staff.
72.	21 July 2014	Unknown	Shelling	Egyptian	Benghazi	Two Egyptian nationals were killed and a third was injured by shells that hit their residence in the Bu Atni area of Benghazi.
73.	23 July 2014	Ansar al-Sharia	Assassination	Libyan	Benghazi	The extremist organization Ansar al-Sharia published pictures of a raid on a Libyan Army barracks in Benghazi, in which it had seized weapons and spoils following bloody clashes in the city that killed at least 16 people and injured 81. The clashes occurred near the Special Forces barracks in the Bu Atni area of Benghazi.
74.	24 July 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Benghazi	Radi al-Zawi, a media activist, former captive, retired colonel and candidate for the House of Representatives, was assassinated by armed individuals, who riddled him with bullets and fled into the city park.
75.	24 July 2014	Libyan Islamic Fighting Group	Siege	Libyan	Tripoli	Armed militias prevented the temporary Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni from leaving the Mu'aytiqah Airport heading to Tubruq city. The airport is controlled by fighters loyal to Abdulhakim Belhaj, the former leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
76.	27 July 2014	Unknown	Shelling	Egyptian	Tripoli	Twenty-three Egyptian workers were killed by a rocket that hit their residence in Mazra'ah, in the Karimiyah area, during clashes between militias fighting for control of the main port in Tripoli.
77.	31 July 2014	Unknown	Killing	Filipino	Tripoli	A Filipino national was beheaded, and a Filipino nurse was gang-raped.
78.	12 August 2014	Libya Dawn	Assassination	Libyan	Tripoli	Unidentified individuals shot and killed Colonel Muhammad Suwaysi, the head of Tripoli police, as he was leaving a municipal council meeting in the Tajura' area.
79.	19 August 2014	Unknown	Shelling	Libyan	Tripoli	Unidentified individuals fired Grad rockets at the Al-Andalus and Qarqarish areas, killing three people.
80.	25 August 2014	Libya Dawn	Miscellaneous	Libyan	Tripoli	Forces taking part in the so-called Libya Dawn and Qasurah operations carried out extensive reprisals against some fighters loyal to the Al-Qa'qa' and Sawa'iq Brigades of the Libyan Army, which had withdrawn from Tripoli Airport and the surrounding areas.
81.	29 August 2014	Al-Qaida	Rocket fire	Libyan	Bayda	Some 12 Grad rockets were fired at the Abraq airport without causing material or human losses.
82.	1 September 2014	Libya Dawn	Armed operation	Libyan	Tripoli	The transitional Libyan Government in the east of the country declared that it had lost control over most Government ministries and institutions in Tripoli after rival armed groups seized control of the capital.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
83.	4 September 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Benghazi	Lieutenant Colonel Wanis al-Awami, a prominent figure who was commander of the military police prison and, before that, served as warden of the political prison, was killed in Benghazi.
84.	20 September 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Benghazi	Brigadier Ahmad al-Mismari, former Chief of Staff of the Libyan Air Force, was assassinated.
85.	20 September 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Benghazi	A series of unconnected assassination attempts claimed 13 victims, including the Islamic preacher Salim Ba'yu and an Egyptian national. Four people survived.
86.	23 September 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Bayda	A car exploded near the headquarters of the Constitution Drafting Assembly in Bayda, destroying three cars. No one was killed.
87.	1 October 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Benghazi	Two electrical towers were bombed in the Sidi Faraj and Marawah areas of Benghazi. The targeted power lines, which link the cities and regions of the east of the country, were severely damaged.
88.	2 October 2014	Ansar al-Sharia	Miscellaneous	Libyan	Benghazi	Some 36 people were killed and another 60 injured in a series of surprise suicide attacks carried out by members of terrorist groups against Army barracks and in bloody clashes in the Benina area of Benghazi, in the eastern region of Libya. Members of Ansar al-Sharia carried out five synchronized suicide attacks and used an ambulance to bomb an Army gate.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
89.	4 October 2014	Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)	Miscellaneous	Libyan	Darnah	Numerous armed ISIL fighters demonstrated through the streets of Darnah, bearing the organization's flag in a procession including dozens of armed vehicles.
90.	5 October 2014	ISIL	Miscellaneous	Libyan	Darnah	The Jaysh al-Islam organization organized a crowded gathering in Al-Sahabah Square in downtown Darnah. The event was titled "The first meeting of the Caliphate based on the Prophetic model". The organizers demanded that the hundreds of residents of Darnah at the gathering repent and join ISIL.
91.	10 October 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Benghazi	One person was killed and another injured in a terrorist operation in Benghazi, when a car bomb exploded in Al-Shahid Abdulsalam al-Masmari Square opposite the Tibisti Hotel.
92.	15 October 2014	Ansar al-Sharia	Armed operation	Libyan	Benghazi	Armed Ansar al-Sharia fighters attacked an Army base in Benghazi.
93.	17 October 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Benghazi	A suicide bombing operation killed four soldiers in the Bu Hadimah area of Benghazi.
94.	22 October 2014	ISIL	Miscellaneous	Libyan	Darnah	The Islamic Youth Shura Council announced the establishment of a so-called Islamic tribunal, presided over by the terrorist Abu al-Bara' al-Azdi, a Yemeni national and member of ISIL. They executed four Libyan nationals.
95.	22 October 2014	Unknown	Raid	Egyptian	Tripoli	Armed men raided the completely empty Egyptian Embassy headquarters and opened fire for several minutes.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
96.	29 October 2014	ISIL	Miscellaneous	Libyan	Darnah	An extremist group called on the people of Darnah in the eastern region of Libya to publicly declare their allegiance to the leader of ISIL on Friday, 31 October 2014.
97.	1 November 2014	Libya Dawn	Combat operations	Libyan	Kikla	Twenty people were killed and another 80 injured by indiscriminate, intense bombardment and clashes between the Libyan Army forces and Libya Dawn forces in Jabal al-Gharbi, Kikla.
98.	1 November 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Benghazi	Three people were injured by shrapnel when a shell landed near a house near the previous location of the Fadil Bu Umar Brigade in the Birkah area of Benghazi.
99.	1 November 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Benghazi	A car bomb exploded on the highway underneath the Al-Arab Medical University in Benghazi. There were no injuries, but damage was inflicted on the maternity ward of the Benghazi Medical Centre, which is located near the site of the explosion.
100.	1 November 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Darnah	Unknown gunmen assassinated Group Captain Abdulrazaq Awad bin Ali in Wadi Imbakh in the Salam area of Darnah.
101.	2 November 2014	Unknown	Combat operations	Libyan	Benghazi	Medical and military sources in Benghazi reported that some 36 people were killed in clashes between the Libyan Army and the forces of the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries.
102.	2 November 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Darnah	An unknown group attacked the Al-Jabal Hotel (a meeting place for writers and artists) in the city of Darnah using an explosive device. No one was injured.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
103.	3 November 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Tripoli	In the Awlad al-Mirghani area near the Friday market in Tripoli, the mausoleum of Shaykh Ahmad al-Mirghani was bombed and razed to the ground. The mosque was built over 700 years ago and was registered as a Libyan historic site.
104.	5 November 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Darnah	Unidentified individuals abducted civilian Muhammad al-Mismari, a member of the civilian movement in support of the Army and Police, in front of the Wahdah Bank in Darnah. Five days later, his beheaded body was found in the Fata'ih area of Darnah.
105.	5 November 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Bayda	The body of Miftah Bu Nafirah al-'Awkali, the director of the Al-Hakim Charitable Association was found on the Abyar area road in Bayda. Unidentified individuals had abducted him from his shop in the city. The body bore traces of torture.
106.	8 November 2014	Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries	Combat operations	Libyan	Benghazi	Five dead and 28 injured Libyan Army soldiers were brought to Marj General Hospital in the wake of clashes in Benghazi between the Libyan Army, on the one hand, and the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries and the Ansar al Sharia organization, on the other.
107.	9 November 2014	Unknown	Abduction	Libyan	Tripoli	An armed group abducted the soldier Hasan Shuwayshin from in front of the Mahari market in Tripoli.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
108.	9 November 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Shahhat	Two car bombs exploded in front of the headquarters of the National Security Agency, which is located near the temporary headquarters of the Transitional Government in Shahhat. The explosions caused extensive material damage, but no one was killed. It should be noted that the explosions coincided with the visit of the United Nations envoy, Bernardino León, to Government headquarters to meet with Prime Minister Abdullah Al Thinni. The 312th Battalion disabled another car bomb in front of Qarnadah military camp in Shahhat.
109.	9 November 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Khums	The body of Abdullah al Musallati, Deputy Prosecutor in the Office of the Military Prosecutor, Khums, and who was known for his opposition to the Libya Dawn operation, was found dumped alongside the road near the ruins of Leptis Magna, near Khums. The victim's hands had been bound.
110.	9 November 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Sirte	A car bomb exploded in the Sirte resort, third residential district, without loss of life.
111.	10 November 2014	Unknown	Shelling	Libyan	Benghazi	A warehouse of medical supplies was completely burned after it had been shelled during the battles that took place in Benghazi between the Libyan Army, on the one hand, and the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries and the Ansar al Sharia organization, on the other.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
112.	10 November 2014	Unknown	Shelling	Libyan	Benghazi	Four shells fell on the headquarters of the Civil Defence in Sidi Husyan area of Benghazi. No one was killed by the shelling.
113.	11 November 2014	Libya Shield	Miscellaneous	Libyan	Benghazi	Eyewitnesses indicated that members of what is known as the Libya Shield ransacked the home of Abdulhafidh Ghuqah, a former member of the Transitional National Council, in the Bal'awn area of Benghazi. They also burned the house of the deceased rights activist Salwa Buqu'ayqays in the Hawari area, as well as the house of the deceased Colonel Salah Buhaliqah, the house of Isma'il al Salabi and the homes of a number of Libyan Army officers in Benghazi.
114.	11 November 2014	Unknown	Abduction	Libyan	Sirte	In Sirte, armed persons abducted Ahmad Ali 'Isa al-Warfali, the Chairman of the Board of the Great Man-made River Water Utilization Authority for the central region.
115.	12 November 2014	Katibat Ubat al-Dhulm (Battalion of those who reject injustice)	Assassination	Libyan	Benghazi	A group calling itself Katibat Ubat al-Dhulm posted a video recording of the execution of Muhammad Miftah Bunahzah, a volunteer from the Libyan Army's Baninah Air Base. The victim was a resident of Suluq, which is located south-west of Benghazi. The video shows the volunteer's throat being cut, after which he is decapitated.
116.	12 November 2014	Unknown	Raid	Libyan	Bayda'	Four Libyan Army soldiers were killed when a suicide attacker drove a car bomb up to the gate of the Abraq military airport.

No	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
117.	12 November 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Tubruq	A car bomb driven by a suicide attacker exploded in the 'Ajaj market near the Petroleum Institute in Tubruq, killing 3 persons and injuring 12 others.
118.	13 November 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Egyptian	Tripoli	A car bomb exploded near the Egyptian Embassy in the Zawiyat al Dahmani area of Tripoli. The explosion injured two members of the diplomatic protection service and caused some material damage.
119.	13 November 2014	Unknown	Bombing	United Arab Emirates	Tripoli	A car bomb exploded on the perimeter of the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Tripoli. Although no one was killed by the explosion, there was some material damage.
120.	13 November 2014	Libya Dawn	Abduction	Libyan	Tripoli	Armed men abducted Ahmad Abu Lusayn, the Dean of the Faculty of Economics, from the university campus in Tripoli. One of his friends suggested that the abductors were members of the so-called Libya Dawn and that they had abducted him in order to force him to resign his post, so that a Libya Dawn supporter could be appointed in his place.
121.	13 November 2014	ISIL	Miscellaneous	Libyan	–	Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the emir of ISIL, in an audio statement entitled "However much the infidels are averse" that was broadcast by the *Furqan Organization*, the media arm of ISIL, declared that his state had expanded to include a number of countries, including Libya, the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, Yemen, Egypt and Algeria, and that they were now new provinces of the Islamic state.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
122.	13 November 2014	Unknown	Attempted bombing	Libyan	Benghazi	The Libyan Army disarmed a car bomb that had been packed with three tons of explosives in the Hayy al-Salam area of Benghazi.
123.	15 November 2014	Libya Dawn	Dispersal of protesters	Libyan	Tripoli	Unidentified persons, believed by eyewitnesses to be members of Libya Dawn, fired on demonstrators who were commemorating the bloody events of Gharghur that occurred in the Libyan capital one year ago, injuring some of them. The demonstrators were speaking out in support of the elected House of Representatives and what is known as the Operation Karamah (Dignity).
124.	16 November 2014	Unknown	Shelling	Egyptian	Benghazi	The bodies of two Egyptian workers and four other injured persons were brought to Benghazi Medical Centre after the bakery in which they worked had been struck by an indiscriminately fired shell. The incident occurred in the Hawari area of Benghazi, where there had been fighting between the Libyan Army, on the one hand, and the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries and the Ansar al Sharia organization, on the other.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
125.	17 November 2014	Libya Dawn	Miscellaneous	Libyan	Tripoli	In an interview with the British newspaper *The Times*, Omar al Hassi, the head of what is known as the National Salvation Government, admitted that Libya Dawn forces are fighting alongside Ansar al Sharia against the forces of Al-Haftar, the leader of the Operation Karamah (Dignity). He said that the organization had a simple, beautiful and loving ideology. He had previously characterized it as a proselytizing group.
126.	18 November 2014	ISIL	Miscellaneous	Libyan	Darnah	In an interview with *Cable News Network*, Bernardino León, the Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), warned of the rise in the numbers of ISIL supporters in Darnah in eastern Libya. He noted that this would present a big problem in the future.
127.	18 November 2014	Libya Dawn	Threats	French	Tripoli	The team of the *France 24* channel closed its office in Tripoli after its correspondent, Sirin al Amari, was threatened. The threats were an attempt by Libya Dawn forces, which control the capital, to influence the channel's news policy.
128.	19 November 2014	ISIL	Miscellaneous	Libyan	Tripoli	ISIL published pictures of its fighters who the organization said were in a city in western Libya, which had been designated the province of Tripoli. The photos were captioned "The lions of the caliphate in Tripoli province" by the media office of the so-called Tripoli province.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
129.	19 November 2014	Unknown	Miscellaneous	Libyan	–	Irina Bokova, the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), called on all parties in Libya to protect the country's unique cultural heritage. She made her call after alarming reports were received regarding the increase in the destruction of, illicit trade in and acts of aggression against the cultural heritage of Libya.
130.	24 November 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Tripoli	In Tripoli, unidentified armed persons assassinated Colonel Mukhtar Musaddaq al Nabbah al Nayli, the head of the technical office of Libyan intelligence.
131.	24 November 2014	Unknown	Raid	Libyan	Tripoli	Unidentified persons invaded the home of the mother of Arif al Nayid, the Ambassador of Libya to the United Arab Emirates, in the Ben Ashur area of Tripoli. They destroyed some of the home's contents and burned others. No one was hurt in the invasion.
132.	25 November 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Benghazi	Four persons who work for the General Service Company were brought to Jala' Hospital for Surgery and Accidents after they had been injured when a bomb placed in a rubbish bin exploded in the Salmani 206 area of Benghazi.
133.	25 November 2014	Unknown	Raid	Libyan	Zawiyah	In Zawiyah, an armed group using rocket-propelled grenades attacked the home of Imhamad Shu'ayb, the First Deputy President of the House of Representatives.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
134.	26 November 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Sirte	In the centre of Sirte, a huge blast caused by the detonation of a high-explosive device caused substantial damage to commercial and service buildings.
135.	28 November 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Ajdabiya	Armed persons assassinated Air Commodore Abdulmajid al Kasih al Zawwi, one of the commanders of the Libyan Army, in Wifaq Street, Ajdabiya.
136.	28 November 2014	ISIL	Miscellaneous	Libyan	Darnah	In early November 2014, the so-called information office of Barqah province published pictures on the *Minbar* website of what it called the first popular gathering of Muslims to support their caliph, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, adding that the purpose of the gathering was to break down the barriers between the Islamic state and Muslims.
137.	28 November 2014	Unknown	Abduction	Libyan	Tripoli	Sheikh Muhammad al Ja'fari, was abducted in the Bab al 'Aziziyah district of Tripoli. Al Ja'fari was known for his sermons against *takfirism*.
138.	29 November 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Benghazi	Armed persons assassinated Fathi al 'Ubaydi, an expert in the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Department, as he stepped out of his home in Markabat Street in the Hawari district of Benghazi.
139.	30 November 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Tripoli	Unidentified persons assassinated Air Commodore Ahmad al 'Akrami in the Siraj area west of Tripoli.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
140.	30 November 2014	ISIL	Miscellaneous	Libyan	Darnah	The information office of the so-called Barqah province, which is alleged to be part of ISIL, published pictures depicting the deployment of members of the Hisbah Office for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice in the streets and markets of what is believed to be the city of Darnah, with a view to ensuring that Muslims apply the rules of sharia in their daily activities and business transactions.
141.	1 December 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Ajdabiya	Three security officers were injured yesterday when two car bombs exploded near the offices of the security services in the city.
142.	1 December 2014	Libya Dawn	Raid	United States of America	Tripoli	Armed persons belonging to the Libya Dawn forces invaded and ransacked the compound of the Embassy of the United States of America in Tripoli.
143.	2 December 2014	Unknown	Shelling	Libyan	Benghazi	A shell landed on a funeral in the Bin Yunus area of Benghazi, killing 11 civilians and injuring six, during clashes between the Libyan Army, on the one hand, and the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries and the Ansar al-Sharia organization, on the other.
144.	8 December 2014	Unknown	Closing of embassies	Belarusian	Tripoli	The Republic of Belarus closed its embassy in Tripoli amid escalating armed conflict in the country.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
145.	9 December 2014	ISIL	Miscellaneous	Libyan	Darnah	ISIL circulated pictures of its militants in the city of Darnah, in what it described as the "Province of Barqah". The pictures showed armed members of the terrorist group taking up positions in various parts of the city.
146.	10 December 2014	Libya Dawn	Raid	Libyan	Tripoli	Armed Libya Dawn fighters raided the headquarters of the Libya Africa Portfolio, Tripoli, in order to install as new manager Mohsen Derregia, who had been appointed by the so-called Salvation Government under Omar al-Hassi, and to compel the Portfolio's employees to return to work under Derregia.
147.	11 December 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Ajdabiya	Armed men attacked the 149th Infantry Battalion in Dawran 'sland, Ajdabiya, killing three sol.iers.
148.	13 December 2014	Unknown	Combat operations	Libyan	Benghazi	According to an Algerian intelligence source, the Algerian leader of the organization Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Abu Yunus Jaylabi Mansur, was killed in Benghazi.
149.	14 December 2014	Unknown	Attempted assassination	Libyan	Tripoli	Gunmen in a car opened fire on the deputy leader of the National Forces Alliance party and Chancellor of Tripoli University, Faisal Krekshi, while he was leaving his house. He survived the assassination attempt.
150.	14 December 2014	Unknown	Miscellaneous	Egyptian	Abu Kammash	Two Egyptians were killed and four wounded in clashes in the Abu Kammash area, near the Ra's Jadir crossing.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
151.	15 December 2014	Unknown	Abduction	Libyan	Tripoli	Mas'ud al-Kanuni, a Professor of Constitutional Law at Tripoli University, was abducted in front of Suq Mahari in Zawiyat al-Dahmani, Tripoli. He holds political and legal opinions critical of the Political Isolation Act and of the ruling of the Constitutional Court.
152.	20 December 2014	Unknown	Raid	Swiss	Tripoli	Unidentified armed men stormed the residence of the Swiss Ambassador, Erwin Hofer, in Tripoli, and ransacked his property before being forced to flee the scene by security forces.
153.	25 December 2014	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Sirte	Fourteen soldiers of the 136th (Jalit) Infantry Battalion of the Libyan Army were killed while guarding the Gulf Steam electrical station west of the city.
154.	25 December 2014	ISIL	Miscellaneous	Libyan	Benghazi	The so-called Media Office of Barqah Province, which is affiliated with the extremist organization ISIL, published an illustrated report of the raiding and arson of homes described as belonging to "apostates" in the Laythi area.
155.	25 December 2014	Libya Dawn	Armed attack	Libyan	Sirte	Libya Dawn forces attacked the oil installations at Ra's Lanuf, launching a Grad missile that hit a petroleum reservoir in the oil port of Sidrah. The fire spread to other reservoirs in the oilfield, consuming over 1,200,000 barrels of oil.
156.	25 December 2014	Libyan Islamic Fighting Group	Armed operation	Libyan	Tripoli	Clashes broke out around the Warshafanah area west of Tripoli.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
157.	27 December 2014	ISIL	Bombing	Libyan	Tripoli	A car bomb exploded in front of the building of the Department of Protection of Diplomatic Missions under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tripoli. There were no victims.
158.	30 December 2014	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Tubruq	A car bomb exploded in front of a hotel in which the elected Libyan Parliament was meeting, in the eastern Libyan city of Tubruq. Three members of parliament were injured.
159.	2 January 2015	ISIL	Armed attack	Libyan	Sawkanah	ISIL attacked the Alfat gate in Sawkanah, southern Libya, killing nine members of the 168th Infantry Battalion who had been guarding the gate and six people who worked at the gate.
160.	6 January 2015	ISIL	Assassination	Libyan	Tubruq	The website Jihadist Media Pulpit published pictures showing ISIL executing the Libyan soldier Salih Idris in eastern Libya.
161.	9 January 2015	Unknown	Abduction	Libyan	Tripoli	Unidentified armed men abducted Muhammad al-Farjani, a member of the Mayah Municipal Council and the Warshafanah Crisis Committee, in the Mayah area west of Tripoli. A source close to the family states that he was taken from a relative's house, which the armed men had raided in order to seize Salim Daww Barini al-Sahli, a writer and activist who is known in the area for his opposition to the activities of Libya Dawn. His brother, Ahmad Daww Barini al-Sahli, was taken to an unknown location along with Al Farjani.

No.	Date	Organization or entity	Type of attack	Nationality of target	City	Description of attack
162.	10 January 2015	Shura Council of Darnah Mujahidin	Armed attack	Libyan	Darnah	Ansar al-Sharia militants killed nine people, including five Libyan Army soldiers, in Darnah. Fifteen others on both sides were injured in fierce clashes when the militants attacked a Libyan Army position in the Ayn Marah area to the west of Darnah city.
163.	12 January 2015	ISIL	Abduction	Egyptian	Sirte	The organization ISIL in the Province of Tripoli claimed responsibility for the abduction of 21 Egyptian Copts.
164.	13 January 2015	Unknown	Bombing	Libyan	Adjabiya	A car bomb driven by a suicide bomber exploded near the position of the Libyan Army at the Jalladiyah gate to the east of Ajdabiya city. Three soldiers were killed and four injured.
165.	17 January 2015	ISIL	Bombing	Libyan	Tripoli	ISIL claimed responsibility for the planting of an explosive device under a security forces car that had been guarding the Algerian embassy in Tripoli. One policeman and two civilians were injured.
166.	19 January 2015	ISIL	Miscellaneous	Libyan	Tripoli	The Suq al-Thulatha' in Tripoli was set ablaze, purportedly to enforce the Sharia, on the grounds that men and women were mixing in the market.
167.	20 January 2015	ISIL	Sabotage	Libyan	Darnah	The so-called Media Office of Barqah Province, which is affiliated with ISIL, published pictures of ISIL militants demolishing a grave and smashing and destroying an ancient statue.

No.	*Date*	*Organization or entity*	*Type of attack*	*Nationality of target*	*City*	*Description of attack*
168.	22 January 2015	Unknown	Assassination	Libyan	Sirte	Unidentified armed men assassinated the acting Director of Security in Sirte, Colonel Al-Sanusi Ka'ibah and his in-law Mustafa al-Sharif al-Maslati in the town centre.
169.	22 January 2015	ISIL	Miscellaneous	Libyan	Tripoli	In a video recording in the Amazigh language, the Tripoli Province branch of ISIL called on the Touareg people of Libya, Algeria and northern Mali to join ISIL and swear allegiance to its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
170.	23 January 2015	Unknown	Armed attack	Libyan	Tripoli	Unidentified men shot at three guards outside a United Nations development office in the Nawfalin area of Tripoli. One of the duty officers was killed.
171.	27 January 2015	ISIL	Miscellaneous	Libyan	–	An ISIL website published a detailed report entitled "Libya: strategic gateway of the Islamic State". The report explains why the organization is interested in Libya, and the most significant factors that make it an important starting point towards realizing the so-called Islamic caliphate.
172.	27 January 2015	ISIL	Armed attack	Libyan/ other nationalities	Tripoli	ISIL claimed responsibility for the huge terrorist attack on the Corinthia Hotel in Tripoli. The hotel was attacked by a car bomb, which was followed by several armed men who attempted to take hostages. The Police then stormed the hotel and eliminated the terrorists. There were eight victims: an American, two Koreans, a Jordanian civilian pilot and some Filipino nationals. Eleven people were wounded, four of them seriously.